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Abstract
Individuals who exhibit the Dark Triad traits of personality are considered to be among the most
troublesome members of society. This review seeks to investigate how the dark traits displayed
by these persons adversely impact their moral behavior as a product of evolutionary development
and adaptation, and as mediated by the BFAS aspect of Compassion. Participants in the present
study completed an extensive questionnaire that included measures of general personality traits,
psychopathy, the Dark Triad of personality, assignment of moral weight, sociosexuality,
infidelity, and a myriad additional demographic features. Predictions for the correlations between
the Dark Triad traits, moral assignment, Compassion, and evolutionary based measures were
generally supported.
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The Dark Triad of Personality:
A Discussion of the Moral and Evolutionary Implications
A “gogetter” attitude is always a plus on your LinkedIn page, but subtle manipulation
skills are not. Valuing your appearance and striving for perfection is lauded and advised, but only
to a point—better not try too hard! Having the ability to approach emotionally taxing situations
in a cogent and deliberative manner is everyone’s dream, but if you always handle situations in
this manner, you are deemed cold and unapproachable. Regarding personality assessments and
characterizations, there is really no way to win, especially when society tells us that our quirks
should be accepted and embraced, but they are disparaged and ridiculed just as frequently.
The truth is, within any given population, one is bound to encounter certain abnormalities
or outliers in personality and behavior. Although some of these small transgressions in normality
are what makes each and every one of us unique, larger divergences in personality may be
deemed aversive.
Some of the most aversive and sinister personality traits in our dreary modern world are
narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy, which together form the psychological subject
of the Dark Triad of personality. High levels of these traits, in combination, are believed to
produce the societal exemplars of turpitude—people so “bad” that runofthemill psychopaths
are overcome with discomfort in their presence. Unfortunately, this level of consideration is often
all that is awarded to the Dark Triad.
One need only consider the ageold advice, “keep your friends close but your enemies
closer,” to see the importance of understanding the Dark Triad beyond its surface level
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debauchery. If one is willing to take a dip into the minds and personalities of some of the world’s
most depraved individuals, a great deal of valuable, psychological information can be obtained.
Furthermore, the Dark Triad has implications related to nearly every topic one can think
of, and then some. Although it is undeniably cool to see which Hogwarts houses align with
which dark traits and why certain fictional characters are depicted as antiheroes, more relevant
Dark Triad research exists that may guide us towards a greater understanding of some of the
most arduous topics in psychology, such as moral decisionmaking and adaptive responses
(Crysel, Cook, Schember, & Webster, 2015).
These Herculean topics will be addressed in this review, but only with the knowledge that
further research is necessary and warranted by the potential ramifications of the Dark Triad. For
the sake of understanding abnormal personalities in aversive and acceptable contexts, it is
pertinent to pursue knowledge of that which we fear.

8
CHAPTER 1:
Historical Context & Key Features
In order to fully understand the malevolent potential that lies within human beings, it is
necessary to delve deeper into the aforementioned psychological subject of the Dark Triad of
personality, comprised of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Though these three
personality traits tend to overlap on many levels, differentiating between them both historically
and conceptually proves useful in fully understanding their budding impact on moral behavior
and social interactions.
First, one should consider narcissism, which is typically characterized by the grandiose
ingrained belief that an individual exists at the center of the universe and that all other people and
things ought to worship him as a result. Narcissists often have a very fragile selfesteem and will
do anything and everything to preserve it. As a result, they display an unmitigated lack of
empathy in their vain and egotistical pursuit of admiration. According to the DSM5, Narcissistic
Personality Disorder (NPD) may also be indicated by the inclusion of interpersonal exploitation
and a general preoccupation with fantasies of success and power, along with arrogant behavior,
envy of others, and a sense of entitlement (American Psychological Association [APA], 2013). It
is important to note that, though many of the characteristics of NPD lend themselves to a greater
understanding of general trait narcissism, the two are not synonymous. Indeed, narcissistic traits
are significantly more prevalent and do not necessarily foreshadow the development of the
personality disorder. Regardless, many of the characteristics remain the same.
Recently, narcissism has become more culturally bound, due in part to the increased use
of social media for voicing opinions and posting flattering “selfies.” Before discussing this
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further, it is important to note that this is likely the result of technological advances, not of the
extreme claim that Millennials are the most narcissistic generation yet, as a result of coddling
and ease of opportunity. Regardless, in a fascinating study, Buffardi and Campbell (2008)
addressed the growing concern that social media sites “offer a gateway for selfpromotion via
selfdescriptions, vanity via photos, and large numbers of shallow relationships,” which may be
linked to trait narcissism (p. 1303). In an effort to glean more than just the general portrayal of
narcissism in online content, the authors designed a study to see if the levels of narcissism of a
single, specific user could be deduced from the content of their Facebook profile. A few
interesting results became apparent: page owners who scored high in narcissism tended to post
somewhat more selfpromoting quotes, were perceived as more physically attractive and
provocative in their profile photos, and had a greater number of “friends.” Ultimately, this
provides support for the growing impact of narcissism. Social pressure is put on individuals to
develop an attractive “Web presence” with content that might serve as a flattering first
impression, and this pressure is increased by the natural tendency to compete with others.
Preservation of this Web presence is vital to many individuals, but one can imagine how it might
be perceived as nearly addictive in quality among narcissistic individuals. Humans have come a
long way from falling in love with their reflections and drowning, like the eponymous Narcissus,
but perhaps profile pages are just modern mirrors.
One might argue that narcissism is the least dangerous of the Dark Triad traits because it
involves a greater obsession with promotion of the self—or, as Freud (2012) often described it, a
nearly autoerotic ego ideal—rather than with malice towards others. In theory, greater mental
harm is done to the narcissistic individual than to his or her connections. However, this appears
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to be somewhat inaccurate, especially in romantic relationships. According to Morf and
Rhodewalt (2001), narcissism may be the result of certain developmental antecedents—the
childhood selfneeds of narcissists may not have been met due to insufficient parental empathy
or consistent neglect. As a result, egocentric individuals may work to satisfy these needs in their
adult relationships, many of which are ripe with antagonism and skepticism. Narcissists have no
boundaries, have delusions of grandeur and unrealistic expectations of perfection, feel that
everyone owes them something, and believe that they are not accountable for their actions. In
combination, these behaviors can be detrimental to the mental and physical health of any
individual repeatedly exposed to them, not excluding the actual narcissist. Now, imagine the
horrific, damaging potential of narcissism, when supplemented with any other trait that has been
deemed “dark.”
The second trait of the Dark Triad is Machiavellianism, characterized by manipulative
behavior intended to bring about successful and expedient personal gain and to promote
sweeping selfinterest, often at the expense of the selfinterest of others—similar to the element
of interpersonal exploitation in narcissism. Furthermore, individuals who have high degrees of
Machiavellianism typically have no regard for the feelings or goals of others, and therefore tend
to have a cynical approach to morality. The concept itself has a rather interesting history, and the
term, not surprisingly, is also an eponym derived from the Florentine diplomat Niccolò
Machiavelli. When the ruling regime, served by Machiavelli, was overthrown, he attempted to
ingratiate himself with the incoming ruler by writing a book of advice, entitled The Prince. The
guidance provided was “devoid of the traditional virtues of trust, honor, and decency,” and
backfired for Machiavelli (Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996, p. 285). The new monarch was not
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pleased with the approach, and the publication of The Prince is often considered to have
dramatically and negatively influenced the format of politics across many nations. As a result,
the employment of cunning and duplicity in everyday conduct began to increase steadily, and
now undeniably plagues the political and social world.
Ironically, it is worth mentioning that Niccolò Machiavelli would likely have tested quite
low for modern standards of Machiavellianism. Despite his assertions in The Prince, which
many scholars believe to be satirical in intent, he was often considered to be selfless and opposed
to manipulation, at least as far as his political power and followers were concerned (Wilson et al.,
1996). In a way, this demonstrates the undeniable shift in contemporary understandings of
political and social machinations. In the 16th century, politicians were expected to uphold certain
virtues, like the aforementioned trust, honor, and decency, which made them better, more popular
rulers. Today, however, if a politician is not perceivably capable of connivance, his career is
likely over before it has even begun. This illustrates an important point—socalled “dark” traits
can potentially shift in apparent darkness over time and in different contexts.
One trait that seems to remain very firmly in the “dark” abyss is that of psychopathy, a
thankfully rare and riveting personality disorder. Psychopathy is most commonly characterized
by enduring antisocial behavior, impulsivity, disinhibition, selfishness, callousness, and
remorselessness. People high in this trait are coldhearted, manipulative, insincere, emotionally
shallow, selfserving, and disturbingly egocentric (Fix & Fix, 2015). The clear overlap in this
description with the previously discussed traits may lead one to wonder, is differentiating
between the Dark Triad traits necessary? Can psychopathy cover the behaviors on its own? This,
in itself, is a hot topic of debate. However, for the sake of clarity and simplicity within this
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review, psychopathy will be addressed both as its own construct in some cases, and as a
component of a larger topic—the Dark Triad—in others. It may prove helpful to look at
psychopathy as a truly nasty cocktail, with narcissism and Machiavellianism acting as an equally
problematic chaser (Paulhus & Williams, 2002).
Just like the Moscow Mule, suddenly trendy again for no clear reason, the foul cocktail of
psychopathy has made a recent killing in popular culture. One need only flip through an
assortment of television channels to find media portrayals of psychopaths, where they are
depicted as smarmy serial killers, violent and maniacal slashers, culturally refined cannibals, and
more (Haycock, 2014). Despite the number of inaccuracies in these depictions, one thing is
clear—viewers thrive on what they fear and long to understand.
Today, at least, understanding psychopathy has become far more manageable, thanks to
progress in conclusively defining it. Psychopathy has been a hazy topic since the inception of
psychiatry in the early 19th century, though it has always been evident that there are individuals
who display a level of unwavering antisocial behavior that “cannot be understood in terms of
mental or emotional disorder, neurotic motivations, or incompetent parenting” (Lykken, 1995, p.
113). French psychiatrist Philippe Pinel used the term “manie sans delire” or “madness without
delusion” to describe these individuals, since they behaved psychotically without actually being
insane. American psychiatrist Benjamin Rush further depicted them as having an “innate
preternatural moral depravity.” As a term, “psychopathic” was coined by the German psychiatrist
J. L. Koch to encompass what we now understand to be personality disorders, and only in 1915,
after the repeated publication of his textbook, did Emil Kraepelin use the term “psychopathic
personality” to refer to individuals with a proclivity for immoral and amoral criminality. Later
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still, the American psychiatrist Hervey Cleckley produced his pioneer monograph, The Mask of
Sanity, which helped to define and substantiate the primary psychopath in context. (Lykken,
1995). As a result, Cleckley’s name remains one of the most influential in the field of
psychopathy, and his initial profiles of psychopaths set the stage for all future understanding.
Although the provision of background material on psychopathy is certainly useful, but
also tends to bring up more questions or fresh topics of interest than it answers or defines. For
instance, since psychopathy was so commonly based around antisocial behavior, it is listed in the
DSM5 as Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD), characterized by “a pervasive pattern of
disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others” (APA, 2013, p. 659). So, despite all of the
decades of effort put into properly labelling psychopathy, the term itself is still not always used
in a clinical setting. Additionally, most people who have watched or read any form of fiction that
attempts to encapsulate the psychopathic personality have also encountered the term “sociopath.”
Despite misleading quotes, such as Sherlock Holmes’ infamous “I’m not a psychopath…
I’m a highfunctioning sociopath,” the two terms are more or less synonymous, unless
differentiated by a specific author (Moffat, 2010). For instance, Lykken (1995) uses “sociopath”
to refer to individuals who actively oppose social norms as a result of their environmental or
familial dysfunction, rather than psychopaths, whose antisocial behavior may result from internal
malfunctions, not poor rearing. On the other hand, the DSM5 notes that APD is often referred to
as psychopathy, sociopathy, or dyssocial personality disorder, suggesting that all three are
essentially synonymous. (APA, 2013).
It is important to note, however, that “psychopathic” is not synonymous with “psychotic,”
which is summed up quite well by Pinel’s use of “manie sans delire,” which touts crazy behavior

14
without clear mental illness. Either way, this distinction is important to keep in
mind—psychopaths are not always insane, or at least not externally.
Another potentially beneficial distinction to be made is that of “immoral” and “amoral,”
which are divergent in meaning. According to the Oxford Dictionary, immoral means “not
conforming to accepted standards of morality,” as opposed to amoral, which means “not
concerned with morality.” In simpler terms, immoral beings are more likely to be seen as evil or
wrong, according to a standard ethical code, whereas amoral individuals tend to be indifferent
towards those ethical standards set forth by society and simply live without them in mind.
Psychopaths are both immoral and amoral—they actively oppose and avoid acknowledging
ethical expectations, which produces all sorts of provocative and problematic societal
interactions.
Psychopathy is a rather daunting feature, even without the undesirable augmentation of
the other two Dark Triad traits. It is easy to see why the traits are considered “dark” in
combination, and to understand that we often accept those aforementioned inaccurate media
portrayals as a way of keeping ourselves at arm's length from potentially dangerous individuals.
The media provided a target for the projection of fear—violent villains and coldblooded
murderers. Unfortunately, the truth is that people who embody the Dark Triad traits are all
around us, in fiction and reality, and do not appear as daunting as one would expect. For instance,
Jonason, Webster, Schmitt, Li, and Crysel (2012) make some fascinating assertions regarding
popular fictional antiheroes, like James Bond. Most Baby Boomers or early members of
Generation X were exposed to the world of Ian Fleming’s flirty yet powerful MI6 secret agent,
and many members of those generations passed on the cultural influence and general attraction to
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those films to their Millennial (or Gen Y) children. In point of fact, the first James Bond film, Dr.
No, was released in 1962, but the franchise has continued to grow in popularity up until the 2015
release of Spectre. Although the action is usually engaging and the actors who depict Bond tend
to be attractive, the films themselves are often predictable and perfunctory. Why, then, have they
continued to do so well over the past halfcentury? One might argue that the success of the James
Bond films is a direct result of the titular character’s exhibition of the Dark Triad (D3) traits.
Again, the Dark Triad is most easily associated with wickedness, but James Bond is
supposed to be the hero. He “gets the girl,” kills the bad guy, saves the day, and repeats, all for
Queen and Country. However, it is just this behavior that denotes the presence of the D3.
According to Jonason et al. (2012), Bond’s killer instinct and psychological comfort in taking a
life, either with his bare hands or an improbable weapon, are likely supported by
psychopathy—his behavior during fight scenes is cold, uncaring, and devoid of empathy. His
mating style, characterized by multiple shortterm relationships (often with married women), is
indicative of the same psychopathic tendencies, and of the interpersonal exploitation element of
narcissism. Additionally, his job as a 007 agent requires him to use Machiavellian manipulation
as a means to an end—he will say or do whatever he has to in order to complete a mission. The
fact that these characteristics remain consistent across the gamut of Bond actors and films
suggests that Ian Fleming felt this personality was necessary to the character. Perhaps he was
aware of the popularity of darkness.
In addition to the plentiful fictional depictions, one need only flip to a news channel to
see a reallife exhibition of the Dark Triad, especially of late. Though the D3 traits exist in
combination outside of the political world, some of the most interesting and relevant cases are
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governmental, due to the maladaptive and troublesome nature of darkness bolstered by power.
For instance, Jonason et al. (2012) note that America’s nowPresident Donald Trump “fits the
mold of a classic Dark Triad massmedia antihero from politics and business” (p. 197). His
narcissism never wanes, and he demonstrates it in every element of his behavior, from his
incessant “Tweeting” to his blatantly grandiose perspective of self. Honestly, one need only
acknowledge the existence of the Wikipedia page titled, “List of things named after Donald
Trump.” Furthermore, he built a real estate empire and won the 2016 election through an
arguably exclusive use of Machiavellian charm, and his callousness, a facet of psychopathy, is
obvious in his constant disregard for human rights and constitutional expectations (and in any
given episode of “The Apprentice”). Nevertheless, a good portion of Americans find him
fascinating and apparently the majority consider him to be a “folk hero of fame, capitalism, and
the American Dream” (p. 197).
Though there are infinite depictions and exhibitions of the Dark Triad available for
discussion and analysis, those mentioned here serve three purposes. First, they highlight the fact
that the D3 traits are everywhere and appear to be most dangerous when teamed with a supposed
cause or momentous source of power. Second, they point out that people are often so caught up
in the intrigue and allure of many of the apparent dark behaviors that they fail to truly question
their motives, morality, and impact. Third, these examples emphasize the spectrum of opinions
drawn out by the D3 traits—it is easy to justify them in a likeable character and even easier to
lambaste them in an unpleasant one. Ultimately, knowing the categorical differences between the
three Dark Triad traits brings up more questions, and provides a basis for deriving potential
implications.
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CHAPTER 2:
Missing Morals & Empathic Poverty
Moral psychology is quite similar to the majority of the fableridden 1990s PBS Kids
shows, in that it seeks to understand human behavior, judgements, reasoning, and character in
moral contexts. More aptly, however, it can be defined as the very broad intersection of
philosophy and psychology that focuses on, not surprisingly, the psychological aspects of
morality. It seeks to understand the development of a moral identity and what motivates us to
form moral judgements about what is right and wrong by asking normative, conceptual, and
empirical questions. Respectively, these are questions that address what should be or is good,
how we best define concepts such as “goodness,” and under what circumstances we are most
likely to demonstrate good behavior. (Tiberius, 2015). Additionally, moral psychology focuses
on how we make the decisions that we do, as opposed to moral philosophy, which explores
which decisions we should make.
Philosophers have struggled with questions regarding the principles of right and wrong in
behavior for centuries, but the addition of psychology as a tool for approaching morals has
proven advantageous in understanding how the moral values of a single person are cultivated to
align with societal ethics.
Morality and Psychopathy
As hitherto emphasized, individuals who display the Dark Triad traits, especially
psychopathy, are both immoral and amoral, suggesting that they have no regard for social rules
and expectations and have not undergone any significant moral development. In many cases, as
highlighted by Robert Hare (1999) in his aptly titled Without Conscience, this translates over to
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the utter lack of remorse or guilt exhibited by psychopaths. Their behavior, though clearly
morally wrong, is egosyntonic; they are unapologetic for their actions and the resulting havoc,
and talk about their conduct openly and comfortably. This characteristic apathy is likely the
result of the astounding psychopathic ability to rationalize one’s undertakings and disregard any
semblance of personal responsibility. Additionally, individuals who display the D3 traits
demonstrate a thorough poverty of empathy. As illustrated, psychopathy leads to a penchant for
indifference “to the rights and suffering of family members and strangers alike,” without the
addition of narcissism and Machiavellianism, which would further encourage egocentrism and
apathy at an abnormal level (p. 45). Still, psychopathy alone has proven to be a consistent
predictor of inappropriate moral behavior across the span of the existing literature, regardless of
philosophical or psychological approach.
One approach to the effect of psychopathy on morality that has unfailingly proven to
generate results is to simply assess moral decision making through the lens of utilitarianism. In a
recent article regarding trait psychopathy, moral judgements, and action aversion, Indrajeet Patil
(2015) describes the utilitarian bias as an “increased willingness to agree to personally kill
someone for the greater good,” and suggests that it is fairly common in psychopaths (p. 349).
According to the author, this is likely because utilitarianism, a form of consequentialism, only
focuses on the repercussions of one’s actions in the frame of right and wrong, without
considering the reasoning behind the action itself. Patil also posits that the ethical opposite of
utilitarianism is deontology, a form of Kantianism, which focuses on the consequences of one’s
actions in addition to the action itself, and which firmly believes that some behaviors cannot be
morally permissible, regardless of the outcome, if they go against the universal rights and duties
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of human beings. Psychologically, the question then arises: what sort of personality traits are
more likely to lead one to take utilitarian action in the face of a moral dilemma? Of course,
psychopathy, and its related features, is a frontrunner.
In order to make the understanding of psychopathy and moral decisionmaking a bit more
approachable, Patil introduces the dualprocess model of moral judgement. This model,
previously defined by Joshua Greene and his colleagues, suggests that there are two sets of
processes that facilitate moral decisionmaking, including: emotional ones, which are responses
to the aversive prospect of harming another person and tend to be deontological, and deliberative
ones, which are based on logically weighing the outcomes of a situation and tend to support a
utilitarian approach. Processes like these are also affected by whether or not the dilemma is
personal or impersonal. For instance, consider the footbridge dilemma, where one must push a
man off a bridge to block a trolley from hitting five bound people. Since it requires one to
physically shove a man towards an inevitable death, purely because his body is there and
available and his death will be beneficial to others (making it a utilitarian action), the footbridge
dilemma is extremely personal. However, in the Standard Fumes dilemma, one is given the
choice to push a button to redirect noxious fumes into a hospital room with one patient, rather
than a room with five patients. In both dilemmas, one person dies for the good of the many, but
the impersonal nature of and psychological and physical distance provided by the fume
digression creates the impression of moral acceptability. Much of this is the result of outcome
aversion—the fear of a harmful outcome for others, which often guides our moral
decisionmaking. We sometimes avoid certain actions because we know that the actions require a
target who will suffer the consequences, and it is easy to empathize with potential
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unpleasantness. Since no one wants to suffer, actually or vicariously, we ultimately avoid such an
action and disparage its use by others. Action aversion plays a part as well—it is similar to
outcome aversion but instead focuses on the harmful action, rather than the result. According to
Patil, the action aversion model requires “proper recognition of distress cues and empathic
response to these cues” in order to effectively develop harm norms, which then trigger the
emotional cues of the dual process model of moral decisionmaking (p. 351). All in all, one
might argue that outcome aversion is to utilitarianism as action aversion is to Kantian
deontology; the former relates to the consequences of a harmful behavior and the latter to the
implications of the behavior itself.
Since psychopaths tend to display a lack of empathic concern for the wellbeing of others
and exhibit very little aversion to anything, it’s not unreasonable to claim, as Patil does, that they
have both low outcome and action aversion, which is tied to a higher likelihood to resort to the
utilitarian bias. In the present study, however, the author asserts that “only action aversion
negatively mediates the influence of trait psychopathy on utilitarian moral judgement,” which
suggests that utilitarian judgements in psychopathy are likely the result of a greater level of
comfort in harming others (p. 349). To test this theory, Patil recruited 404 Italianspeaking
participants between the ages of 18 and 60 through online sources and word of mouth. All
participants gave informed consent and then completed an online survey, which included a
modified version of an action/ outcome aversion questionnaire and a pair of moral dilemmas
(where the footbridge dilemma was personal and the Standard Fumes dilemma was impersonal).
Additionally, they completed the the Levenson SelfReport Psychopathy (LSRP) scale, a
selfreport measure of primary and secondary psychopathy that operate through two factors:
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callousunemotional traits, regarding personality, and lifestyleantisocial traits, regarding
behavior. Items are rated on a 4 point Likert scale, and higher scores indicate higher prevalence
of the measured trait.
The basic results of this study were predictable. Participants reported greater aversion to
harmful outcomes than to harmful actions, and felt that utilitarian approaches were more
appropriate in impersonal dilemmas than in personal ones. Additionally, the responses to
personal dilemmas garnered more disagreement among the participants. Men also tended to
demonstrate greater levels of primary psychopathy, according to the LSRP, though there was no
gender difference for secondary psychopathy. Women were more averse to both harmful actions
and outcomes. Lastly, and not at all shockingly, total psychopathy score was associated with
reduced action and outcome aversion, as well as greater perceived acceptability of personal and
impersonal moral dilemmas. However, after controlling for variance, it became clear that only
primary psychopathy was correlated with action aversion, and was connected to a greater
endorsement of the utilitarian option in all decisionmaking. Secondary psychopathy was not
strongly associated with any of the included variables. Ultimately, this supports the logic that
increased levels of psychopathic traits, such as callousunemotional traits, are positively
correlated with higher likelihood to endorse utilitarian methods as morally acceptable and to
perform and observe harmful actions and outcomes.
Patil wraps up his research by keenly asserting that psychopaths likely engage in harmful
behavior without fear for the outcome because “they lack the moral barometer in the form of
moral emotions stemming from empathic aversion that usually informs and motivates individuals
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to avoid imposing harm on others,” (p. 360). In other words, psychopaths presumably hurt for
moral faculties, but especially in the form of emotion perception.
Along these lines, it is impossible to deny that affect and emotion influence our moral
judgements and decisions but in her recent paper, Michelle Maise (2014) suggests that emotion
may actually be a vital component in moral cognition. She refers back to the dualprocess model
of morality and asserts that emotion and deliberation are simply not enough to fully encompass
morality when psychopathic outliers are thrown in the mix. Furthermore, she claims that
psychopaths do truly lack the ability to be moral cognizers, but only due to their deficient
affective faculties, which leaves them with only deliberative processes to apply to moral
judgements.
In contrast, Cima, Tonnaer, and Hauser (2010) sought to counter the long established
theory that psychopaths lack the ability to distinguish between right and wrong as a result of
deficient emotional processes. Instead, they hypothesized that psychopathic persons have a
regular understanding of ethics and morality, but an “abnormal regulation of morally appropriate
behavior” (p. 59). To test this hypothesis, they recruited a sample of 14 psychopath and 23
nonpsychopath offenders (for a total sample size of 37 delinquents) from a psychiatric center in
the Netherlands, in addition to a control group comprised of 35 Dutchmen. All participants were
male, and IQ scores were obtained for 20 of the delinquents, the mean scores of which showed
that psychopaths had a marginally lower IQ than nonpsychopathic offenders, which counters the
misconception of psychopaths as brilliant criminal masterminds. In this study, participants were
assessed and diagnosed with Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist  Revised (PCLR), one of the most
common and wellrespected measures of psychopathy to date, which measures a wide variety of

24
psychopathic traits based on medical and legal records and an extensive, timeconsuming
interview. The PCLR assesses psychopathy on a two factor model, and was the pioneering
measure for such an approach. Additionally, to provide further support for the link between
psychopathy and emotion, all participants were given a physiological test, similar in nature to the
Trier Social Stress Test (TSST), which assesses stress reactivity based on cortisol levels. This
appraisal found that the cortisol levels of psychopathic offenders did not increase in response to
the applied stressor, as opposed to the cortisol levels of the other two groups (nonpsychopathic
and healthy control), which did increase significantly. Ultimately, it became clear once more that
psychopaths diverged from nonpsychopath offenders in levels of diminished emotional
reactivity, based on the evidence provided by the PCLR scores and the physiological measure of
stress response.
After solidifying these key differences in offender emotional response, Cima et al.
presented the participants with seven impersonal and fourteen personal moral dilemmas, which
ask the participant to give a “yes” or “no” response regarding their willingness to perform a
certain morally murky action. However, due to the dishonest nature of psychopaths, the
researchers also administered the Sociomoral Reflection (SRMSF) questionnaire, which poses
candid questions related to the moral permissiveness of a variety of common wrongdoings, such
as keeping a promise to a friend or not stealing something of value. These responses were
measured on a fivepoint Likert scale of importance, and the results were relatively predictable.
Similarly to the results of the study by Patil (2015), all three test groups considered impersonal
cases to be more morally permissible than personal cases, regardless of equal utilitarian gain,
which is likely the result of the perception of immediacy, or distance, in said dilemmas. We tend
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to perceive impersonal cases as less emotionally intense than personal cases because we can
distance ourselves from them and their potentially aversive outcomes. Furthermore, although
psychopaths have proven to be more utilitarian in judgement, the results of this study found no
statistically significant group effect for either impersonal or personal moral dilemmas. Education
and age, additionally, did not have a significant effect on judgements of the dilemmas. The
authors also explored the endorsement of the utilitarian outcome as far as other and selfserving
actions were concerned, and were surprised to find that psychopaths were not significantly more
likely to endorse selfserving utilitarian actions than nonpsychopaths and healthy control group
members, which suggests that they formed judgements using the same processes as the others,
despite their callousunemotional traits. More so, though the data was not significant,
psychopaths showed slightly lower SRMSF scores than the healthy control group and the
nonpsychopath offenders, which suggests that they had a generally lower threshold for what
might be defined as morally permissible.
Though their research sought to address the belief that emotional processing is a
necessary component in moral understanding and that the faulty processes of psychopaths
elucidate their moral indiscretions and lack of concern for others, Cima et al. came to
conclusions that appear contradictory, yet do disprove existing assumptions. For instance, why
would a psychopath follow the same line of moral judgement as anyone else, but come to a
different conclusion about the moral permissibility of an action? From these oddly antithetical
results, one might glean that psychopaths do not necessarily lack the mental ability to understand
the differentiation between right and wrong, but instead lack the desire to adhere to society’s
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moral standards. Indeed, it appears that psychopaths are the honey badgers (of viral video fame)
of the human population—they simply don’t care about the consequences of their behavior.
Operating on the idea that psychopaths cannot force themselves to care about moral
behavior despite their ability to comprehend why something is or is not moral, we encounter a
new quandary in the form of different types of morality. Do psychopaths truly not care about
moral expectations as a whole, or are only certain types compromised?
Thankfully, this quandary is addressed, in depth, by Glenn, Iyer, Graham, Koleva, and
Haidt (2009), who sought to evaluate the relationship between psychopathy and the foundations
of morality, explore potential mediating factors, and understand how these relationships shifted
with respect to the measured psychopathic dimensions.
To provide background for their research, Glenn et al. discuss five psychological systems
of moral foundations that had been previously defined by Graham and Haidt (and colleagues;
2011), two highly esteemed social psychologists who have devoted years to the understanding of
moral psychology. The first of these foundations is the harm/ care one, which revolves around
compassion and addresses concerns regarding violence and the suffering of others. The second
relates to fairness/ reciprocity, and deals with equality, justice, and balanced relations. The third
moral foundation is the ingroup/ loyalty foundation, which focuses on group membership and the
expected devotion and preferential treatment it demands, and the fourth is authority/ respect,
which relates to obedience, duty, and honor. The fifth and final foundation is of particular
interest, since it acts as an ideal rather than an expectation: it is the purity/ sanctity foundation,
which represents a dignified lifestyle “based on intuitions about divinity, feelings of moral
disgust, and purity of body, mind and soul” (Glenn et al., p. 386). In the past, it has been asserted
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that psychopathy is most often associated with impaired harmbased moral reasoning, a factor of
the harm/ care moral foundation. This assertion aligns with the previously discussed literature,
and presents easy opportunities to establish connections between utilitarian posturing and poor
harmbased reasoning. On the other hand, linking psychopathic behavior to the other four moral
foundations has proven somewhat challenging in the past. In this study, however, Glenn et al.
succeeded in determining how effectively psychopathy scores predicted the endorsement and
sacredness of each foundation.
A survey was made available to 2,517 adult volunteers who had previously completed the
LSRP scale on yourmorals.org. Some demographic information, including age, sex, education,
and a measure of political identity, had been collected when participants initially created a
personal account for the Website. From that point, respondents were authorized to complete one
or more additional surveys, such as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ), which asked
participants to rate the moral relevance of foundationspecific concerns in respect to their moral
judgments, and to indicate their level of agreement with some moral statements. 2,172 of the
overall 2,517 volunteers completed this measure. The Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale,
submitted by 1,252 individuals, measures how much an individual values each moral foundation
by posing questions related to the payment one would expect in return for violating a related
belief. A measure of empathy, the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, was completed by 648
participants, and a measure of preference for equality versus social hierarchy, the Social
Dominance Orientation Questionnaire, was filled out by 462. Additionally, a Disgust Scale, used
to see if disgust could mediate the probable relationship between psychopathy and the purity
foundation, was completed by 1,343 participants and 593 took the Ethics Position Questionnaire,

28
which determined what might be considered moral or immoral according to two dimensions:
idealism and relativism. Both of these dimensions provide a glimpse of the rigidity of certain
moral beliefs.
Through various analyses, Glenn et al. found that combined psychopathy score predicted
lower endorsement of the Fairness and Harm foundations and slightly higher endorsement of the
Ingroup foundation. In both cases, Factor 1 of psychopathy, was an expectedly stronger predictor.
Still, the Authority and Purity foundations were weakly related to it, if at all, and disgust showed
no connections, which implies that individuals who test high in LSRP traits make moral
judgements related to Authority, Purity, and disgust on about the same level as “normal”
individuals. Additionally, regression results suggested that higher psychopathy scores were better
predictors of low scores on the Empathic Concern and Perspective Taking scales, which were
positively correlated with the Harm and Fairness foundations. Through this established link, the
authors became aware of Empathic Concern as a mediator in the relationship between
psychopathy and the Harm foundation. Individuals who had high LSRP scores tended to have
low Empathic Concern scores, which then predicted a low endorsement for the Harm/ Care
foundation of morality.
In addition to being the best predictor of low support for the five moral foundations,
LSRP scores also predicted a greater willingness to accept a bribe to go against any personal
beliefs regarding those morals, which implies that psychopaths are more ready and willing to
abandon moral tenets for incentives, like money. Psychopathy scores also predicted greater
idealism on the Ethics Position Questionnaire, which suggests that, unsurprisingly, psychopaths
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are more willing than others to violate morals in certain situations and to believe in situational
moral flexibility.
Another intriguing result came to light: higher psychopathy scores also predicted a
slightly higher endorsement for the Ingroup foundation, which appears counterintuitive. Since
psychopaths tend to be loners, as a result of their callousness, one might assume that they would
oppose the inclusion of the Ingroup morals. However, the author suggests that the loyalty and
distaste for betrayal that characterize this foundation probably take shape as a result of an
increased lack of concern for outgroup members, animosity towards members of opposing or
conflicting groups, and decreased tolerance for group defectors among psychopaths. Though this
doesn’t feel like much, it implies that it is safer to be in perceived cahoots with one’s
psychopathic pals.
By and large, the research performed by Glenn et al. provided support for the idea that
moral deficits in psychopathy are concentrated in two main dimensions—Harm and Fairness, or
rather apathy and equity, suggesting that a great deal of these results are likely related to empathy
and the psychopath’s inability to provide it. Though why psychopaths demonstrate such low
Empathic Concern for others, and sometimes themselves, is still to be discussed, impairments in
learning are a likely culprit.
Building off of the now wellestablished belief that individuals who are higher in
psychopathy are more willing to endorse harmbased immoral behavior, authors Ritchie and
Forth (2016) sought to further scrutinize the relationship between psychopathy and morality by
narrowing the field of relevant factors and facets in the prediction of moral wrongdoings.
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Furthermore, due to the general lack of literary discussion, they decided to investigate whether
this daunting relationship was moderated by participant gender.
In order to do so, Ritchie and Forth analyzed data from a final sample of 534 willing
undergraduate students who completed an online questionnaire. Participants were recruited
through an electronic research bulletin, and given a single course credit upon completion.
Measures included Greene’s Moral Dilemma Questionnaire (MDQ), which assesses ability to
make socially acceptable decisions in the face of a variety of personal moral dilemmas, and
Paulhus’ SelfReport Psychopathy Scale  Short Form (SRPSF), which takes a twofactor,
fourfacet approach to psychopathy. These four facets are interpersonal manipulation, callous
affect, erratic lifestyle, and antisocial behavior.
Through AUC analysis, the authors found that men were slightly more willing to endorse
personalharm as a method of obtaining a desirable outcome than women were, which aligned
with the small amount of existing literature. Additionally, from a series of bivariate correlations,
Ritchie and Forth found that positive interactions existed between moral transgressions and total
psychopathy scores, as well as between both Factor 1 and Factor 2 psychopathy scores (with
their four respective facets) and the endorsement of personalmoral transgressions. These results
are not groundbreaking, as they suggest that individuals with higher psychopathy scores, and
therefore greater levels of psychopathic traits, are more comfortable endorsing personal moral
wrongdoings. In other words, psychopaths are not vexed by the prospect of harming another
person, especially as a means to an end.
Numerous linear regressions were also conducted to see if gender, total psychopathy, and
the interaction between these two variables forecast personalmoral transgressions. It was
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determined that gender was a significant predictor of personalmoral harm endorsement, with
men as the more probable transgressors. Total psychopathy score was also a significant portend
for the endorsement of personalmoral harm, despite a fairly insignificant relationship between
gender and psychopathy. This suggests that men with high psychopathy scores are just as likely
as women with equal scores to endorse the personal, harmful behaviors. Additionally, after
controlling for gender and the other three facets, only the interpersonal manipulation (IM) facet
of Factor 1 psychopathy was a significant predictor of endorsement, which “suggests that the
interpersonal manipulative characteristics of psychopathy drive involvement in immoral
behavior” (p. 251).
To expand upon the topic of morality, Ermer and Kiehl (2010) decided to examine social
exchange and precautionary reasoning in psychopathic individuals. First, they agreed with the
points made by Cima et al. regarding the ability of the psychopath to understand the differences
between right and wrong (even if they have little interest in doing so). The authors also noted
that psychopaths “persistently violate social, moral, and legal norms, cheating family, friends,
and strangers alike” and “engage in impulsive, reactive behaviors that have destructive
consequences for themselves and other people” (p. 1399). Since it is a challenge to explain these
characteristics outside of the context of moral “right” and “wrong,” an additional quandary
becomes evident: do psychopaths comprehend and effectively reason through behavior related to
risks and cheating?
Based on previous literature and statistics, Ermer and Kiehl hypothesized that
psychopaths were impaired in social contract reasoning (cooperation), and precautionary
reasoning (riskmanagement), compared to nonpsychopaths, but were not impaired in
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descriptive reasoning. This was evaluated through the examination of a sample of 67
incarcerated males between the age of 2056 years from an American correctional facility, who
were paid $1.00 an hour for their time. Psychopathy was assessed with Hare’s PCLR, total IQ
was estimated from a modified version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), and a
questionnaire about postheadinjury symptoms was given to remove any participants with prior
psychosis or traumatic brain injury. Additionally, inmates were given a shortened version of the
Wason selection task, which consisted of 10 social contract, 10 precautionary, and 10 descriptive
problems. In this context, social contracts are the rules of exchange and cooperation—something
like, “if you take this, then you must do this in return.” In context, this element is related to
cheating and deception. Precautionary rules are very similar, but are based more on how one
prepares for potential dangers, so that “if you do this unsafe thing, then you should take these
precautions. Here, they relate to one’s ability to eliminate potential hazards. Descriptive
problems are the most straightforward and only deal with describing something that is or is not
logical through an “if—then” statement. For instance, “if a student is an Honor Scholar, then that
student must love writing.”
Results were consistent with the aforementioned hypotheses—high psychopathy scores
did predict significantly worse performance on social contract problems and precautionary
problems. However, psychopaths and nonpsychopaths performed about the same on descriptive
problems, which is understandable. Descriptive problems rely more on basic logic than on an
understanding of others and risks. Additionally, intelligence did not differ between psychopaths
and nonpsychopaths, but was significantly positively correlated with social contract reasoning
and descriptive reasoning. Intriguingly, however, these results did not apply to the DSMIV
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defined APD, which suggests that impairments in certain forms of reasoning may actually be
specific to the construct of psychopathy.
Furthermore, interpersonal and affective traits from Factor 1 of PCLR psychopathy
were the only traits significantly correlated with both social contract and precautionary problems.
Since interpersonal manipulation and behaviors have proven to be predictors of immoral
behavior, and affect is directly linked with perception of morality, Ermer and Kiehl’s results
provide greater support for the theory that psychopaths may actually have some impaired moral
reasoning, in addition to their apathetic life views.
Acknowledging the existence of differences in reasoning between psychopaths and
individuals with APD brings up an interesting and repetitive point: morality may differ to some
degree between psychopaths and persons who demonstrate the Dark Triad traits, despite the
overlap in characterization.
Morality and the Dark Triad
Though research has been done to link the Dark Triad to counterproductive work
behavior, vocational interests, racism, low selfcontrol and high impulsivity, empathy, and
mating behaviors, very little has examined the relationship between the D3 traits and moral
values. To correct this clear gap in research, Jonason, Strosser, Kroll, Duineveld, and Baruffi
(2015) focused on the five moral values that were previously defined by Graham et al. (2011):
harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity. Jonason et al. also looked at individual v. collective
interests, which were broken up into four additional social values: selftranscendence,
conservation, selfenhancement, and openness to change. These reflect value systems related to
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spirituality, political conservatism and conformity, personal enjoyment, power, and sensualism,
and social justice and equality, respectively.
With this information in mind, three studies were performed. In Study 1, the value
systems associated with the D3 traits were assessed through the application of the Dark Triad
Dirty Dozen (a 12item measure), the 20item IPIP for the Big Five personality domains
(Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism),
and Graham’s Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ), which analyzes degree of relevancy and
agreement with certain moral statements. 585 Americans between 18 76 years old completed the
task, and were awarded $2.00 on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a crowdsourcing Internet
marketplace that allows for the use of human intelligence to perform various tasks.
Results were unsurprising—men scored higher on all D3 traits and the Ingroup moral
foundation than women did, but women scored higher on the Harm and Fairness foundations,
suggesting that men value loyalty among comrades, and women have high expectations for
kindness and equality. Sex differences in D3 traits did partially mediate individual preference for
certain foundations. More so, Machiavellianism was not specifically linked to any of the moral
matrices, which suggests the maintenance of moral flexibility for the sake of success and
support. Fairness, Ingroup, Authority, and Purity foundations were positively correlated with
narcissism, but negatively correlated with psychopathy, which Jonason et al. believed “might
reveal the socially sensitive nature of narcissism relative to the socially insensitive nature of
psychopathy” (p. 103).
In the second study, 252 American university students between the age of 1851
completed an online questionnaire for course credit. The Dark Triad was measured through
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Paulhus’ 27item Short Dark Triad (SD3), and moral foundation preference was assessed through
26 taboo tradeoff items, which asked participants to note the amount of money it would take to
convince them to engage in a taboo behavior. Men scored higher than women did in psychopathy
and Machiavellianism and women scored higher (or expected more money) on the taboo
tradeoffs related to Harm, Fairness, Ingroup, and Purity.
Since the first two studies focused only on morality in relation to the D3, Jonason et al.
attempted to replicate their results in Study 3, with the addition of social values. This study was
performed on a sample of 516 Germans between the ages of 1748, in order to extend the
generalizability of the findings. Participants were recruited for the online study through email or
social media sites, and were given different incentives through the hosting website.
The researchers returned to German translations of the measures used in Study 1—the
Dark Triad Dirty Dozen and the MFQ—in addition to the German version of the 21item scale of
the Portrait Values Questionnaire, which asked participants to rate their liking of a fictitious
person based on presented goal motivation.
Results from Study 1 were replicated, but “men scored higher than women did on the
higherorder value of individual interests, whereas women scored higher than men did on
selftranscendence,” (p. 105). As expected, psychopathy was highly correlated with Individual
Interests, especially SelfEnhancement, but was negatively related to Collective Interests,
SelfTranscendence, and Conservation. Narcissism and Machiavellianism shared the same
positive relationships, but both were negatively correlated to SelfTranscendence and the latter to
Collective Interests, as well—however, these interactions disappeared when variance was
accounted for.
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Ultimately, Jonason et al. reached conclusions that were supportive of prior literature
related to the D3 traits and psychopathy. For instance, psychopathy, here, was related to very
little value placed on any moral or social foundations. Contrary to the results found in
psychopaths by Glenn et al., which noted higher scores for the Ingroup foundation and lower
scores for the Fairness and Harm foundation, Jonason’s sample had lower scores on Fairness,
Ingroup, Authority, and Purity, and no significant differences in Harm value. This likely suggests
a difference in predictive ability that can only be accounted for by the variance produced by the
inclusion of the other two D3 traits of narcissism and Machiavellianism.
Jonason et al. also found consistent mediation effects, which suggest that moral and
social values may play a role in explaining why men and women differ on the Dark Triad traits”
(p. 106). It appears that the way Machiavellianism and psychopathy play out among men,
especially, is related to mating behavior and social manipulation. However, narcissism may be
immune to these moral and social value effects not because narcissists are more moral or “good”
people, but because they rely on the inclusion and acceptance of others in order to obtain the
attention and acknowledgement that they crave.
As previously discussed, utilitarian moral judgement is consistently linked with higher
psychopathy scores. Not surprisingly, this is true of the Dark Triad as well. Recently, Djeriouat
and Trémoliere (2014) investigated this relationship, but also sought to expand upon it by
considering the mediating effect of certain personality traits, like Honesty/Humility, and moral
foundations, like Harm/Care. They opened their article on an illustrative note with a reference to
the original version of Star Trek 2: Wrath of Khan, in which Spock saves the ship from a
problematic and deadly warpdrive malfunction at the cost of his life. He dies a painful, radiation
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induced death, but saves the crew and memorably asserts that the good of the many outweighs
the good of the few. This behavior is acceptably utilitarian in its intentions, because Spock is
known for his logical approach to every situation. In contrast, however, Spock and Kirk trade
places in the 2013 remake, Star Trek: Into Darkness. Though the sacrifice is more tearjerking in
this version, it intriguingly doesn’t draw direct attention to Kirk’s uncharacteristic utilitarian
behavior, but instead focuses on his compassion. This is likely because, in many (human)
individuals, such a sacrifice may be praised, but the logic behind it is often frowned upon.
Indeed, utilitarian inclinations are sometimes necessary, but remain to be startling in
action, to a degree. There is something offputting about deliberative, logical sacrifice, rather
than a more deontological, emotionbased one. Based on this, one might assume that utilitarian
judgments are more often predicted by a rational thinking style, as opposed to an intuitive one,
and that if psychopathy increases utilitarian endorsement, which has been proven, then the Dark
Triad traits are likely also predictive. Furthermore, this preference may not be based exclusively
on moral identity, but may also be mediated by empathyrelated personality features, such as
Honesty/Humility and Harm/Care.
To test this logic, Djeriouat and Trémoliere (2014) administered an online survey to 180
participants through MTurk. The survey included an assessment of the degree to which
respondents would perform a utilitarian action or not, in addition to the SD3, and the MFQ. They
also completed the 60item HEXACO personality inventory (HEXACOPIR), which focuses on
six factors in the understanding of personality: (H) Honesty/Humility, (E) Emotionality, (X)
Extraversion, (A) Agreeableness, (C) Conscientiousness, and (O) Openness to experience.
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In the end, all three D3 traits were positively and significantly correlated with
predilection for utilitarian judgements, and Honesty/Humility and Harm/Care were positively
correlated with the nonutilitarian actions (which would be, by definition, deontological). Gender
also had an effect—within the male portion of the sample, Machiavellianism and psychopathy
were correlated positively with utilitarianism, whereas with the female sample, all three D3 traits
were positively correlated. All in all, Djeriouat and Trémoliere provide further support for the
conclusion that interpersonally aversive traits, especially psychopathy, are linked to propensity
for utilitarian moral judgements, but also add “insight into the relationship between emotion and
utilitarianism in moral judgments by empirically specifying some key mediators” (p. 15). Even
though all three Dark Triad traits were independent predictors of Honesty/Humility, psychopathy
was the only trait that predicted Harm/Care interactions, which suggests that psychopathy may
have more predictive power than the other D3 traits. Additionally, the authors point out that
“emotional callousness, expressed by lack of empathic and prosocial concerns, may occasionally
coincide with a decision that maximizes the aggregate wellbeing. In this perspective, some
people would consider callous personalities sometimes useful,” especially when those people
believe that utilitarian action would be a moral choice, but lack the gumption to proceed on their
own (p. 15).
Curiously, Djeriouat and Trémoliere found very little interaction between narcissism and
morality, which may not suggest that psychopathy outweighs the other two D3 traits regarding
morality, but rather that narcissism may be mediated differently. In their now year old study, Zuo,
Wang, Xu, Wang, and Zhao (2016) examined the relationships between the Dark Triad traits and
two facets of personal morality. These two facets are moral identity, which refers to the amount
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of value one places on being a moral person, and prosocial behavior, which refers to actions
intended to benefit others (but which often lead to personal gain, as well). Additionally, moral
identity has two dimensions: internalization, or “the degree to which the moral traits are central
to selfconcept,” and symbolization, or how an individual’s actions are reflected in the real world
(p. 272). All of these components are thought to be crucial in regards to moral behavior.
Based on previous literature, the authors assert that the performance of morality and
“good” moral behavior is an effective way for narcissists to maintain their selfesteem, which is
definitely a win for the Dark Triad. However, this also suggests that moral decisions in
narcissists are motivated by validationseeking, and are therefore unlikely to last once the
egothreat is gone. From this, Zuo et al. hypothesized that, as opposed to psychopathy and
Machiavellianism, narcissism is likely positively correlated with moral identity, especially
symbolization, due to its visible and public nature. Additionally, they suspected that this behavior
is entirely mediated by selfesteem, and is not actually the result of some hidden moral goodness
within narcissists.
To test their hypotheses, Zuo et al. administered a paper and pencil questionnaire to 2,828
Chinese middle and high school students between the ages of 1319. The questionnaire included
the SD3, the 10item Moral Identity Scale, the 23item Prosocial Behavior Scale, and
Rosenberg’s SelfEsteem Scale. Strangely, the results of this study did not entirely match up with
results in similar studies. For instance, in this sample, males had higher scores than females on
all three D3 traits, not just Machiavellianism and psychopathy, which suggests that the mediating
effects of gender on the D3 may be culturally bound. However, females produced significantly
higher scores on internalization, symbolization, prosocial behavior, and selfesteem.
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Additionally, narcissism was positively correlated with all of the measures of personal
morality, including internalization, symbolization and prosocial behaviors. On the other hand,
Machiavellianism and psychopathy were negatively associated with the majority of the
measures, but notably showed no interaction with symbolization at all. To the surprise of the
authors, the “relationship between narcissism and internalization was nonsignificant when
selfesteem was low but negative and significant when selfesteem was high,” (p. 275). Less
surprisingly, however, the negative association between narcissism and both symbolization and
prosocial behavior was significantly stronger in individuals with low selfesteem scores. All of
this emphasizes the common belief that narcissism is the least nasty of the D3 traits—as Zuo et
al. suggest, it is the “bright facet in the Dark Gem” (p. 275). Of course, that doesn’t make
narcissism any more acceptable, but certainly provides a glimmer of hope in the gloom of the
Dark Triad.
On a relatively unrelated but still fascinating note, there exists a theory that moral
proclivity varies during the course of a nychthemeron, with individuals displaying lower
morality in the evening. This theory, called the Morning Morality Effect (MME), has been
consistently supported, but hadn’t been considered in the context of the D3 until recently. At last,
however, Roeser, McGregor, Stegmaier, Mathew, Kübler, and Meule (2015) looked at the
relationship between the D3 and moral behavior, as a function of the time of day.
In order to do so, the authors collected data from 195 primarily female online volunteers
who were recruited through various social media sites, and were allowed to take the
questionnaire between 7:00  10:00 a.m., or between 4:00  7:00 p.m.. All participants completed
the SD3 and the Global vigor and affect instrument (GVA), which “consists of eight items asking
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for current alertness, sadness, tension, effort, happiness, weariness, calmness, and sleepiness” (p.
74). Additionally, they performed a messagetask and a matrixtask, which operationalize
unethical behavior through an assessment of decision making and visual understanding of
opportunities to increase profit, respectively.
In this sample, men scored higher than women on all three subsets of the SD3. Higher
Machiavellianism scores predicted greater likelihood to select a dishonest message on the
messagetask. However, this effect was not moderated by time of day. Similarly, on the
matrixtask, psychopathy was positively associated with number of lies told, but was also not
moderated by time of day. Most likely, the monetary incentive included in the reasoning behind
the two tasks had a more significant effect. Although time of day did not predict anything
regarding moral behavior with the D3 traits, this may be because participants were not randomly
assigned to either time condition, but were instead able to choose. Since it has become clear that
narcissists tend to maintain the air of morality, individuals who exhibit all three D3 traits may
actively choose the time of day when they feel most capable of maintaining moral behavior.
Roeser et al. make another convincing point—it can be hard to justify unethical behavior based
solely on personality traits that may manifest differently, to a degree, in every individual.
Therefore, when assessing morality, considering the situation that may influence the behavior is
relevant, in order to make a legitimate attribution of morality. However, this study does not
provide support for that theory, since morality was only predicted by dark personality trait, and
was unaffected by situational factors (such as time of day).
Ultimately, moral behavior and judgements truly can be considered a function of
personality traits, especially the lugubrious and depressing ones of the Dark Triad. This
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knowledge has many applications, but also poses some risks. If personality is assessed in
individuals with the knowledge that Dark Triad traits are consistent predictors of immoral and
unethical behavior, then psychologists gain a powerful tool for adumbrating and identifying
potential threats to society. However, it can become too easy to fall prey to the fundamental
attribution error, where one may assume that an individual’s behavior is exclusively the result of
his personality, when immoral behavior may truly be the result of challenging socioeconomic
conditions or poor social education (in some cases).
The Effect of Affect and Empathy
As has been hinted at throughout this discussion, empathy has been considered a
necessary component for moral behavior since the dawn of moral discourse. Despite the clear
associations between the two, defining the socalled “relationship status” of empathy and
morality has proven challenging, due to the flexible definition of empathy, and the occasional
mixed data regarding its value. However, it is advantageous to consider empathy from its most
basic definition: “an affective response to the directly perceived, imagined, or inferred emotional
state of another being,” or “an otheroriented or even ‘moral’ social emotion” (Maibom, 2014, p.
160 161).
As Maibom underscores, empathy is vital to some aspects of morality, even if one
believes, as many scholars do, that it is not a fundamental ingredient. She argues that it may be
most relevant as an epistemological mechanism, which allows the observer to experience the
affective state of the observed, and to understand the consequences of certain actions as
performed on others. Through this design, empathy can serve as a developmental factor which
educates individuals about the outcomes of their behavior, therefore motivating them to adjust to

43
society’s ethical expectations. In a way, empathy is the best educator, motivator, and ultimate
panacea for behavior. Unfortunately, though it often guides moral behavior towards greater care
for others, it risks steering us away from other potentially necessary moral principles, such as the
maximization of efficiency in the face of equality. Ultimately, just like everything related to
morality, empathy can be hard to define as good or bad, beneficial or distracting.
Regardless, it is impossible to assert that empathy does not play a significant part in the
moral behavior of psychopaths or individuals who exhibit the Dark Triad traits. Indeed, the utter
apathy among psychopathic persons provides support for empathy as a mediator for morality—it
even appears that deficits in moral judgements are more common when a moral reasoning task
requires consideration of the distress, fear, and additional emotions of others. (Maibom).
Additionally, although psychopaths understand the distinctions within moral obligations and
reasoning, their lack of emotion makes them consistently unable to comprehend or care about the
importance of altering their behavior. (Schramme, 2014). In a very poignant statement that has
proven the test of literary time, Johns and Quay described the empathic deficit among
psychopaths as knowing “the words, but not the music” (1962, p. 217). Essentially, psychopaths
know exactly what moral rightness is and how to sell it, but lack the acoustic support of
emotionality and empathy that might allow them to understand and replicate it.
The Dark Triad is, logically, very similar. In a recent study, Wai and Tiliopoulos (2012)
sought to expand on existing discussions of empathic influence on morality and the D3 by
focusing on the affective and cognitive systems of empathy. The first of these, affective empathy,
refers to “the generation of an appropriate emotional reaction in response to others’ emotions,”
and is often compared conceptually to emotional contagion (p. 794). Emotional contagion is

44
much like the modern, cynical concept of “catching feelings,” where individuals experience
strong responses towards others, regardless of whether or not they want to. Catching feelings is,
like an actual contagion, denigrated among many populations who believe that distance is an
emotionally safer counterpart to empathy. Cognitive empathy, however, is “the ability to discern
emotional states of others without undergoing emotional contagion,” and is undoubtedly
preferable and more objective in many circumstances (p. 794). However, due to its more
functional nature, cognitive empathy may underlie more manipulative personalities.
To test this theory and to observe which D3 traits were related to which forms of
empathy, the authors administered an online experiment to 139 university students. Measures
included the MachIV, a 20item measure of Machiavellianism, the 40item Narcissistic
Personality inventory (NPI), and the LSRP to assess the Dark Triad traits. Additionally, an
empathy quotient (EQ) instrument, and a selfassessment manikin (SAM) were given. The
participants were presented with black and white photos of individual faces, and were then
instructed to rate their feelings toward the depicted individual. They were also instructed to try to
identify what emotion the photographed persons might be feeling, based on their facial
expressions. This provides an alternative method of assessing empathy, beyond the use of
another selfreport measure.
Results of the study were consistent with the previous literature and the authors
predictions. Psychopathy and Machiavellianism had lower global empathy, no change in
cognitive empathy, and all three traits predicted lower affective empathy. Intriguingly, however,
narcissism showed a slight increase in cognitive empathy, suggesting that narcissists strive to
understand the emotions of others in order to know how they themselves are perceived.

45
However, narcissists also tend to fall prey to the selfreport bias, since they see themselves as
more capable than they truly are, so their SAM responses may have been skewed. Narcissism
was also positively correlated with valence towards sad images and anger identification, whereas
psychopaths felt better when looking at sad, angry, and fearful images and worse when
examining images with happy vibes. Additionally, higher psychopaths scores were correlated
with greater inaccuracy in identifying all emotions. Machiavellians responded the same as
psychopaths, but only inaccurately identified happy and sad emotions. Overall, “primary
psychopathy was the only significant negative predictor of global and affective empathy, while
narcissism was a significantly positive predictor of cognitive empathy” (p. 796). All in all, these
clear, measurable results regarding empathic poverty provide significant support for the belief
that empathy affects morality, which is affected by the D3, in turn.
Understanding morality, especially in the context of psychopathy and the Dark Triad, is
an undertaking that one could easily devote her life to, and which cannot be done justice in a
chunk of a thesis. However, empathy is something that we experience on a personal level
(hopefully) nearly daily—optimizing our empathy and avoiding the desire to shy away from
emotional contagion, except when necessary for personal wellbeing, may potentially reduce the
risk for moral and empathic deficits in a portion of the population, and provide further insight
into conceptually persistent poverty of emotion.
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CHAPTER 3:
Evolutionary Approaches to Dark Traits and Morality
When it comes to weighty topics, only evolution challenges morality, and often creates
challenges itself. For instance, evolution is such a broad topic that there is almost too much to be
said about it. Arguably, the thoughts, behaviors, and existences of every living creature are
founded in evolutionary processes, and if one examines the world through this lens, everything
begins to feel overwhelming.
However, evolution is so rarely taught on a valuable and worthwhile level that discussing
it can also be underwhelming. For example, most people who hear the term immediately think of
Charles Darwin. Then they falter, try to push the boundaries of their memory a bit further, recall
the concept of “natural selection,” and call it a day. All in all, walking the line between too much
information and too little can be difficult, especially with a topic as necessary and interesting as
evolution and its effects on psychopathy, morality, and other personality traits.
Despite the remark about Darwin being underwhelming, his pioneering contributions to
the study of evolution are eternally relevant in the field, beyond the popularity he has garnered
among amateur biologists, wannabe psychologists, and diehard “Planet of the Apes” fans. In
fact, Darwin’s theory of ethics is one that has consistently influenced evolutionary and moral
psychology for decades, since it posits that ethical capacity cannot be reduced or limited to
intelligence and ability, because it also involves social instincts and emotions. Since this provides
support for approaching morality as a function of emotions such as empathy, one might note that
Darwin’s theory has also influenced this thesis. Furthermore, like a good scientist, Darwin did
not attempt to derive a theory of “right” and “wrong” from his conclusions, but instead
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designated this moral dichotomy for the philosophical field, rather than to his empirical realm of
evolutionary moral psychology. (Holcomb, 2004).
Darwin’s theories also helped produce two etiological conceptions of psychopathy: the
first of these is pathological. It suggests that psychopathy is the result of something wrong in the
individual who displays the dark traits, and guides us towards classification. This perspective is
what lead to the diagnosis of psychopathy as a mental illness, and to the creation of labels like
APD. (Barr & Quinsey, 2004).
Though there is nothing wrong with this pathological approach, numerous studies, such
as the aforementioned one by Cima, Tonnaer, and Hauser (2010), have proven that psychopaths
are not mentally deficient or strapped when it comes to morality. Their behavior is not a function
of their intellect, which suggests that it must result from something else. The second conception
of psychopathy is that, as opposed to being the result of a broken mind, it is a response, or
adaptation, to certain selective pressures. For clarity, adaptations can be defined as “specific bits
of physical machinery originating in the genes, developing in a particular environment, and
increasing the biological success of the organism” (Bridgeman, 2003, p. 2). This adaptive
conceptualization is often referred to as Life History Strategy (LHS), a theory which “predicts
that varying amounts of stress will produce differing individual biodemographic outcomes,” and
which is easily supported by genetic or hereditary evidence for the aversive personalities,
emphasis on the necessity of the aversive traits in a specified environment, and proof that these
traits increase biological success in those who display them (Patch & Figueredo, 2016).
Genetic Evidence for Psychopathy

48
Providing genetic and hereditary support for psychopathy as an adaptation is quite easy,
especially when twin studies, which provide strong support for trait heritability, are available.
Due to the relative newness of the Dark Triad construct, it has been applied to many twin studies,
such as the one by Vernon, Villani, Vickers, and Harris (2008). The authors administered the
NEOPIR, NPI, MachIV, and SRPIII to 75 monozygotic and 64 dizygotic twin pairs in an
effort to behaviorally and genetically asses the Dark Triad variables and their relationship with
other personality traits, like the Big Five. In the end, though the phenotypic results of Vernon et
al.’s study were interesting, what matters most is that their twin correlations and behavioral
genetic modelfitting analyses suggest that both psychopathy and narcissism have a
moderatetolarge heritability component, especially among monozygotic twins, who share more
genetic similarities. Machiavellianism, however, was only mildly heritable.
Furthermore, if one wishes to consider heritability and genetics in an evolutionary
context, then there is nowhere better to look than among the apes. In their very recent study,
authors Latzman, Patrick, Freeman, Schapiro, and Hopkins (2017) sought to to examine the
heritability of psychopathy subdimensions in a sample of 178 chimpanzees. These
subdimensions were assessed with the previously developed and validated 18item CHMPTri
scales, which mirror the three factor Triarchic Psychopathy model and focus on Boldness,
Meanness, and Disinhibition. The chimpanzees were rated by staff members on a 7point Likert
scale (1 = least descriptive of the chimpanzee; 7 = most descriptive of the chimpanzee), and
heritability was estimated with Sequential Oligogenic Linkage Analysis Routines, which applies
a variancecomponents approach. Early rearing experiences (mother or nurseryreared), which
may contribute to behavior, were also considered with MANCOVAs. Curiously, the authors

49
found that although “all three triarchic dimensions showed significant heritability among
motherreared participants, heritability was not evident for any dimension in the nurseryreared
subsample” (p. 7). This provides an interesting argument for the neverending “nature vs.
nurture” discourse, since it suggests that the availability of a mother activated the D3 traits.
When rearing experiences were not considered, however, boldness and meanness, but not
disinhibition, were both significantly heritable across the board. These results conflict to a degree
with similar studies done in human populations, where disinhibition has proven to be extremely
heritable, often above all other aversive personality traits.
The Dark Triad as an Adaptive Response
Once the genetic background of adaptive qualities has been introduced, albeit on a
painfully small scale level, one can next consider the idea of psychopathy and the D3 as a
necessary development in response to a specific environment. Contextually, many scholars argue
in favor of psychopathy as a life history strategy “involving high mating effort, social defection,
high risk acceptance, and aggression,” which may provide the greatest amount of and most
convincing material about psychopathy as an evolutionary response (Barr & Quinsey, p. 312).
Assuming that psychopathy developed under certain selective pressures (which may have created
a specific environment), such as the expectation of parental investment, it follows that, among
psychopaths, mating efforts are pursued more aggressively than parental efforts.
Among most animals, the rselection strategy, which proposes the production of many
offspring but with minimal investment in each, is the key to reproductive success and
guaranteeing the survival of one’s genes in the next generation. It sort of operates as a trial and
error method, where one continues to try and try until successful, though in this case, success in
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conception and subsequent birth. Among most humans, however, the Kselection strategy takes
precedence, and demands low reproductive rates but high parental investment in the offspring.
Due to this clear societal expectation of a longlasting relationship with consistent support being
absolutely necessary for reproduction, finding a mate can be especially challenging—both
partners must judge the suitability of each other in a longterm capacity, but on a shortterm time
frame. Gender differences occur as well: men tend to approach reproduction more through
rselection, due to the ease of conception on the male’s end. Females, who have to endure nine
months of physiological strife, and then some, are far more likely to be selective in choosing a
mate—they must specifically seek out men who are more willing to provide longterm parental
investment, as well as resources and other forms of support. (Bridgeman).
Here enters the adaptive value of psychopathy, especially among males—men who
appear to be convincingly attached to the Kselection strategy for a relationship are more likely
to be chosen by women as mates. Psychopaths, of course, could care less about actual parental
investment and the provision of resources for others, as supported by recent studies which have
found that criminals are known to endorse and live by a strict rselection strategy (Yao,
Långström, Temrin, & Walum, 2014). Irregardless, sex (and its genetically beneficial
consequences) is always a plus to a psychopath, so shortterm opportunities must be obtained
through evolutionary deception.
Operating on the continued assumption that psychopathy and the Dark Triad are nearly
the same, due to their consistent overlap in trait features, it is worthwhile to consider methods of
mate attraction in both, as available. For instance, recently, authors Fox and Rooney (2014)
performed an experiment regarding trait selfobjectification as a predictor for the D3, as
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moderated by social media use, in a nationally representative sample of 800 men under the age of
40. Participants were given the SelfObjectification Questionnaire (SOQ), which assesses
traitlevel selfobjectification through rankings of personal body traits related to appearance and
competence from most to least important. Competence rankings are attracted from appearance
rankings, and a higher final result indicates higher selfobjectification. The men also took the
Dirty Dozen, estimated how much time they spent per day on the five most popular social media
sites, noted how many times they took and posted selfies, and responded to questions about their
use of photo editing methods and effects. Ultimately, trait selfobjectification, the D3 traits, and
age were all correlated with time spent on social networking sites. When controlled for age,
however, only narcissism and trait selfobjectification were found to be significant predictors.
Though this mostly tells us about a narcissist’s desire to be acknowledged virtually, it suggests
that men may use social media as a method of display for mate attraction.
Not surprisingly, displays like these tend to work. Based on the finding that individuals
with high levels of narcissism and psychopathy are often considered to be physically attractive,
Holtzman and Strube (2012) sought to assess the D3 traits as a social lure for creating good first
impressions. 111 students at a university formed a target sample, and completed a series of
selfreport measures, including the MachIV, the NPI, the Narcissistic Personality Disorder
(NPD) subscale of the Multisource Assessment of Personality Pathology, and the SRP, in
addition to the Analogue for Multiple Broadband Inventories for the Big Five factors of
personality. The target participants also provided methods of contacting some of their peers, who
were asked to assess the targets based on items from the D3 related measures. From the resulting
data, it became clear that individuals with higher levels of the three dark traits tend to have more
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effective selfadornment. In other words, they dress better, which warrants greater attention and
compliments, and creates a sort of selffulling prophecy. The attention received boosts the
selfesteem of people with the Dark Triad traits, and they use the gained confidence as fuel in
attempting to obtain a shortterm sexual partner or other goal item. Though this looked at
nongenetic components of attractiveness, such as fashion, it still involves playing to one’s
strengths in the pursuit of a mate.
The effect of D3 men on “regular” women is also worth mentioning—in a recent study,
Marcinkowska, Lyons, and Helle (2016) examined mate choice and offspring total as influenced
by preferences for certain facial characteristics. These facial preferences, which have spanned the
ages, “may be shaped by natural selection, as faces provide information on the individual's
ability to produce high quality offspring, and can reveal qualities (such as cooperativeness) that
could be desirable in a longterm partnership” (p. 287). To test the relationship between these
evolutionarily founded preferences and the D3 traits, Marcinkowska et al. obtained a variety of
sexual behavior and menstrual cycle related demographic data from an online sample, and also
administered the Sociosexual Orientation Inventory (SOIR) to assess sexual openness (Penke &
Asendorpf, 2008). Participants were then asked to select the more attractive face in 15 sets of
forced choice trials. In each of these sets was a face created from a “high” and “low” Dark Triad
morph. All of the pictures were viewed twice, separately for short and longterm mating context
after a short description of the context and an understanding check was given.
Marcinkowska et al.’s results were quite interesting: women with strong preference for
highly narcissistic male faces had a greater number of offspring for their respective age, as
opposed to women with strong preference for highly Machiavellian faces, who had fewer
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offspring. Preference for psychopathic faces was not at all related to offspring total, surprisingly.
This effect may be due to the high correlation between narcissism and the Big Five factor of
Extraversion, suggesting that narcissists have embraced their superficiality and have learned to
use it as a social mechanism for engaging others. Furthermore, narcissism is positively correlated
with social status and physical attractiveness, the product of hours devoted to personal perfection
and success, and negatively correlated with infidelity, likely due to the need for consistent
positive feedback and an unwillingness to risk ruining one’s image. Still, it appears that
narcissism is also greatly linked to shortterm mating strategies, as it provides the narcissist with
endless reinforcement. These results also supported those previously found by Marcinkowska,
Helle, and Lyons (2015) in a similar study—women who showed preference for narcissistic (but
not Machiavellian or psychopathic) faces were more sexually unrestricted (according to the
SOIR) and did not use contraception as consistently, regardless of short or longterm mating
context.
Since this study and its predecessor focused mostly on attractiveness, it is unsurprising
that narcissism showed the greatest effects and most significant relationships. However, it is
possible that Machiavellians and psychopaths have greater sexual success when judged for traits
unrelated to physical appearance. Unfortunately, very few studies exist that don’t consider
mating strategies as a function only of sexual and physical veneers, which certainly introduces a
topic to consider pushing further in the future.
Due to the clear connection between the D3 traits, attraction, and total number of
offspring, Qureshi, Harris, and Atkinson (2016) endeavored to delve further into the relationship
between D3 attraction and age. For the most part, studies of attractive features in individuals
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with high Dark Triad scores have only been performed with younger women, who biologically
have higher libido, are at the peak of their fertility, and seek shortterm relationships, all of which
makes them slightly more susceptible to the charm of the manipulative D3 men. Qureshi et al.
were interested in seeing how these effects shifted in different age groups of women, since ideal
traits in partners undeniably shift in congress with physical and mental development. To do so,
the authors collected data online from 1001 undergraduate women and older women from
various communities. Participants were asked to read short descriptions of fake men written from
amalgamations of narcissistic, psychopathic, and Machiavellian personalities, and were then
asked to rate the attractiveness of the D3 men on a 6 point Likert scale, in addition to indicating
their willingness to engage in hypothetical interactions with the men. Lastly, the women divulged
their current position in their menstrual cycle and general fertility status.
Some of the results of this study were consistent with previous literature. For instance,
greater attraction towards any Dark Triad personality predicted higher desirability ratings for
theoretical short and longterm relationships. However, age had surprisingly no effect on ratings
of high or low D3 personalities. Age was negatively correlated with willingness to engage in
shortterm affairs with the highscoring D3 personality, but this effect was not present in
lowscoring D3 constructs. This suggests that, contrary to logical belief, fertility may not always
affect attractiveness ratings or perceptions of Dark Triad personalities, but age may mediate the
relationship.
Handinhand with sexual success is social dominance, which is often accompanied by
increased access to resources and mates, higher socioeconomic status, and better health, all of
which feed back into greater opportunities in mate selection. Not surprisingly, individuals with
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higher Dark Triad scores tend to have more significant levels of social dominance, but how they
might have gained it remains to be seen and was only recently addressed by Semenyna and
Honey (2015).
The authors emphasize the use of prestige and success among humans, unlike other
creatures, to establish social dominance, or, in some cases, implement leadership strategies,
coalitionbuilding, and cooperation to take control. To assess this in a sample, participants were
given the Rank Styles with Peers Questionnaire, which considers dominance styles in three
subscales: dominant leadership, coalition building, and ruthless selfadvancement, in addition to
the Dirty Dozen and the Dominance and Prestige Scale, which measures amount of striving for
social success. The NPI, MachIV, and SRPIII were also administered to check the singular D3
constructs.
At last, Machiavellianism had its shining moment—it was significantly associated with
dominancestriving and powerseeking, which makes a great deal of sense. Machiavellians most
likely manipulate in an effort to gain. Narcissism was most strongly correlated with
prestigestriving, which also fits. Prestige goes along with attention as well as Simon goes with
Garfunkel. Amusingly, none of the D3 traits were correlated with coalitionbuilding. No one
likes to work with individuals displaying these traits, and it can be hard to support or believe in
any cause that they truly endorse. Plus, D3 persons often seem to think that they’ll function
better on their own anyway. Along this line of thinking, many scholars believe that LHS
promotes cooperation, especially in economic games, but this has proven to be untrue,
suggesting that the application of LHS within the D3 does not always affect one’s willingness to
play with others. (Wu, Balliet, Tybur, Arai, Van Lange, and Yamagishi, 2017).
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Similar to social dominance is social influence, which Dark Triad individuals also tend to
acquire. How they do so, according to Jonason and Webster (2011), is far more straightforward
than the process of obtaining dominance. It appears that, D3 persons run through a syntax of
standardized, prepared tactics in various situations. The fluidity in application of these tactics
allows them to avoid detection, but their a “whatever it takes” approach to influence is much
harder to hide. According to this theory, D3 individuals will use whatever tactic is necessary to
achieve a desired effect, regardless of whether it seems “insensitive to the relationship with the
target” (p. 524). This is clearly adaptive, as these persons have learned to do what it takes to get
what they want, no matter what they have to put other through. In some circles, this is considered
good politics, or even good marketing, and certainly overlaps with the moral view of
utilitarianism.
In addition to developing in an environment that involves competitiveness for mates and
demands shortterm relationships, psychopathy and the other Dark Triad traits likely emerged as
an “offensive defense,” or, more simply, a classic defense mechanism. Very little had been done
to study how certain deviant traits, like the Dark Triad, might be affected by the need to distance
oneself from certain aversive situations until Richardson and Boag (2015) sought to understand
how the D3 traits alter one’s approach to the process of stress management. To do so, they
administered the SRPIII, NPI, and MachIV to an online sample of 244 individuals.
Additionally, participants were asked to complete the Defensive Style Questionnaire (DSQ40),
which measures tendencies towards certain defensive behaviors and sorts them into mature,
immature, and neurotic groups, and the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS10), which measures the
degree to which certain life situations are perceived as stressful.
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Machiavellianism stood out again, but only because it was associated with the greatest
number of immature defense strategies, such as passive aggression and projection. Psychopathy
also appeared to lean towards immaturity, but favored isolation, dissociation, and acting out.
Narcissism, on the other hand, was most related to mature defenses, like sublimation and
anticipation. Furthermore, “narcissism was negatively correlated with stress whereas
Machiavellianism was positively associated with stress and psychopathy demonstrated no
relationship with stress. Out of the three traits Machiavellianism was most likely to predict
stress,” (p. 150). One element of this makes perfect sense on its own—as has already been
demonstrated, psychopaths care very little about the effect they have on their surroundings, and
equally little about any consequences related to their behavior. Therefore, it follows that in the
face of stress, psychopaths would feel nothing. According to the authors, this can be described as
“exercised numbness,” and also explains why psychopaths favor isolation as a defense
mechanism (p. 151). However, in this study, the results for Machiavellianism and narcissism
were extremely paradoxical, and certainly warrant further research.
On another level, Jonason, Icho, and Ireland (2016) very poignantly assert that “all
people may have the potential to be high or low on the Dark Triad traits. This potential comes
from the encoded potential in the human genotype” (p. 9). From here, the circumstances that
individuals encounter are the precipitating factors that shape personality and phenotype. The
authors further assert that the Dark Triad traits are the phenotypic response, or evolutionary
adaptation, to a harsh, unbending, and unpredictable world, which serves as the precipitating
factor for trait activation. However, for this theory to function, it assumes that the Dark Triad
traits are, indeed, genetic and heritable. This article also introduces a somewhat cyclical
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argument within the discussion of the D3 and evolution—it is undeniably an adaptive response,
but what came first? The environmental need for the dark traits, or the genetic predetermination
to have them?
Biological Success of the Organism
The final aspect of claiming something to be evolutionary is suggesting that it increases
the biological success of an organism, which is proven to be true in this case every single time a
person engages in a shortterm sexual relationship with someone high in D3 traits and
sociosexuality, or openness to sexual experiences and opportunities. As previously discovered by
Marcinkowska, Helle, and Lyons (2015), individuals who find D3 traits attractive are also less
likely to be using contraception, increasing the chances of genetic distribution for the Dark Triad.
Furthermore, the D3 traits are consistently related to infidelity as the result of lower levels of
relationship commitment (Brewer, Hunt, James, & Abell, 2015), and primary psychopathy
predicts defection on lowvalue social and romantic relationships (Gervais, Kline, Ludmer,
George, & Manson, 2013). Both infidelity and defection create opportunities that allow for
further distribution of genes, potentially guaranteeing subsequently successful generations of
offspring.
In their study of the conditions related to the Dark Triad traits, Jonason et al. (2016) make
another point that cannot be stressed enough: “adaptation” is not synonymous with “good.”
Giraffes growing longer necks in order to reach the highest, juiciest tree leaves is a good
adaptation, but it also creates challenges for other animals that had already developed that ability
but now encounter competition for resources. Humans developing the manipulative, callous, and
apathetic traits (to name a few) of the Dark Triad to promote shortterm sexual success and to
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achieve social dominance and influence is not necessarily good. Adaptations clearly benefit
those who gain them the most, but when they risk harming the majority of the population
through their application or present new challenges and competitions for biological
opportunities, they become questionable in morality. Hence, morality and evolution remain to be
hefty topics, especially when they both consider certain aversive traits.
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CHAPTER 4:
Morality, Mating, and Models of Personality
The Dark Triad of personality, comprised of the traits of narcissism, Machiavellianism,
and psychopathy, has demonstrated a significant effect on moral and ethical behavior, and in turn
has implications regarding everyday interactions and decisions. Among these decisions are those
related to other human beings, especially regarding moral and sexual judgements. Based on the
evidence, support, and guidance provided by the previously reviewed literature, the present study
was formulated to delve a little bit deeper into the effect of the Dark Triad (versus a single
Psychopathy construct) on the assignment of moral value and sociosexual behavior and
infidelity.
From the information collected in the preceding review and a handful of years of
enlightening psychology courses, the author hypothesized that the Dark Triad would be a better
predictor of immoral behavior than the plain psychopathy measure, despite the legitimate and
scholarly assertion that psychopathy, as a construct all its own, encompasses the behaviors
portrayed by individuals with high Machiavellianism and narcissism scores. Additionally, the
author suspected that the Harm and Laziness factors of morality would be most significantly
correlated with D3 psychopathy, or the Disinhibition construct of the TriPM. Lastly, based on the
theory that morality is mediated by empathy and emotion for others, and that psychopaths are
incapable of demonstrating that empathy, the author suspected that the Compassion aspect of the
BFAS would be negatively correlated with, and Sociosexuality and Infidelity would be positively
correlated with all three of the D3 traits.
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Method
Participants & Procedure
Data was collected from a total of 188 participants (91 females) who were recruited
through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a crowdsourcing Internet marketplace that allows
humans to perform various intelligence tasks for a monetary fee. In this study, “Turksters” were
paid $2.25 upon completion. The questionnaire took approximately 45 minutes to finish and was
administered online through a Google form.
Measures
1.1 Short Dark Triad (SD3) (Jones & Paulhus, 2014)
The socially aversive traits of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy, known in
congress as the Dark Triad, were assessed through the application of Jones and Paulhus’ 27item
SD3, a brief proxy measure. This measure was designed in 2014 to provide an alternative to the
previously mentioned “Dirty Dozen” (DD) scale (Jonason & Webster, 2010), which consists of
only a dozen items and appears to be too short. Indeed, since the DD only has four items to
measure each construct, it has demonstrated weak correspondence to the original constructs and
may be lacking some essential content. The SD3, however, has 9 items for each construct and
has proven to have good internal consistency. In this measure, participants are asked to rate their
agreement on a 5 point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree) with an
assortment of statements, such as: “Make sure your plans benefit you, not others” (Jones &
Paulhus). Each set of 9 items is then averaged to create indexes of Machiavellianism ( = .87),
narcissism (Cronbach’s

= .86), and psychopathy ( = .79). Descriptive statistics and correlation

coefficients among the three indices can be found in Table 1. Consistent empirical support for the
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SD3 makes it the best alternative measure of the Dark Triad, comparable only to the
administration of specific measures for each construct, such as the NPI, MachIV, or SRPIII,
which Jones and Paulhus used as their standard measures.
Table 1
Descriptives, Cronbach’s alphas, and Pearson’s correlation coefficients among SD3 indexes.
M

SD

1. Machiavellianism

26.93

7.64

.87

2. Narcissism

21.68

8.03

.86

3. Psychopathy

18.17

6.63

.79

*** p < .001

Note. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation,

1

2

3

—

0.381***

0.605***

—

0.505***
—

= Cronbach’s index of internal consistency.

1.2 Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM) (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009)
To provide further support for the role of psychopathy in predicting certain moral and
mating behaviors, the TriPM was also included in the questionnaire. This allowed the authors to
see if psychopathy did serve as a better predictor on its own, rather than with the inclusion of
narcissism and Machiavellianism.
The TriPM was chosen over other validated measures because it assesses psychopathy
along three specific phenotypic dimensions: (1) boldness, which is related to dominance,
anxiousness, and audacity, (2) meanness, which reflects the psychopathic tendency towards
callousness, aggression, brutality, and excitement seeking, and (3) disinhibition, which reflects
“tendencies toward impulsiveness, irresponsibility, oppositionality, and anger/hostility” (p. 2).
These three dimensions map well onto the D3 traits and provided a fresh, more modern approach
to psychopathy than the traditional twofactor model. Furthermore, the TriPM is only 58items
long, which makes it short and sweet in comparison to many other existing measures, like the
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PCLR or the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI). Descriptive statistics and correlation
coefficients for the three constructs and a total TriPM score can be found in Table 2.
Regardless, the measure requires participants to rate their level of agreement with
statements made about their personality on a 4point Likert scale (0 = False; 4 = True).
Table 2
Descriptives, Cronbach’s alphas, and Pearson’s correlation coefficients among TriPM
dimensions.
M

SD

1. Boldness

27.67

12.60

.92

2. Meanness

12.25

9.88

.91

3. Disinhibition

13.15

9.20

.88

TriPM Total

53.08

20.67

.90

1

2

3

Total

—

0.099

0.230**

0.563***

—

0.619***

0.807***

—

0.597***
—

** p < .01, *** p < .001

1.3 Moralization of Everyday Life Scale (MELS) (Lovett, Jordan, & Wiltermuth, 2012)
Morality was operationalized through individual assignment of moral weight to everyday
behaviors and interactions, and was measured with the upandcoming MELS. Participants were
asked to read the 30 given scenarios, which involved a common occurrence with a questionably
moral response, and then rate how morally acceptable the behavior was using a 7 point Likert
scale, from 1 (not wrong at all; has nothing to do with morality) to 7 (very wrong; an extremely
immoral action). Six main dimensions were represented within these vignettes: deception, harm,
laziness, failure to do good, bodily violations, and disgusting behaviors. In this context,
deception was related to lying and cheating, harm was related to detrimental behavior in one’s
community, laziness was related to decision making based only on convenience, failure to do
good was tied to missed opportunities to perform supererogatory actions, bodily violations
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encompassed substance use, sexual behaviors, and intentional disfigurement, and disgust was
related to any other behavior that is generally considered gross. Scenarios appeared in the
following format (with a Likert scale provided as well):
Noah is at an ATM outside a bank and the machine dispenses $60 more than he
requested. He keeps the money rather than taking it into the bank and explaining the
situation to a bank clerk.
This example is related to the deception dimension, as Noah’s behavior is clearly
underhanded and, by most standards, immoral. Some of the scenarios are as straightforward as
this, whereas some truly lead the participant to question her expectations of others.
All in all, the MELS scores had a satisfactory internal consistency of

= .85. The alphas

of the 6 factors and their related r values can be found in Table 3. The relatively high alphas
produced by the measure suggest good internal consistency and interitem reliability. In other
words, the items as a whole and within each dimension appear to be measuring the same things,
without excessive levels of redundancy. This measure was also chosen over other existing
measures of morality due to its manageable length and use of everyday scenarios. Although
various moral measures have been put to use more frequently, very few actually assess mundane
immoral behavior. Since these daytoday transgressions are ones that even the least “dark” of us
may overlook, their inclusion is uniquely useful in fully understanding how morality is affected
by the D3. Not all “bad” things are extreme, and the subtle immoral behaviors are likely more
common and taxing on an individual’s personality over time, as opposed to a few rare and nasty
decisions. Additionally, using commonplace vignettes likely produces data with greater external
validity.
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Table 3
Cronbach’s alphas and Pearson’s correlation coefficients between MELS factors.

1. Deception

.80

2. Harm

.76

3. Laziness

.88

4. Failure

.87

5. Body

.86

6. Disgust

.81

MELS Total

.85

1

2

3

4

5

6

Total

—

0.672**

0.223**

0.458***

0.298***

0.279***

0.618***

—

0.178*

0.481***

0.217**

0.467***

0.635***

—

0.621***

0.744***

0.574***

0.759***

—

0.621***

0.586***

0.844***

—

0.655***

0.819***

—

0.805***

*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

—
Note. MELS = Moralization of Everyday Life Scale.

1.4 Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS) (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007)
Since empathy (and other personality traits) is often highly correlated with morality and
psychopathy, personality was assessed with the 98item BFAS, which looks at the Big Five
factors of personality, and attributes two aspects to each domain, or factor. Although the only
aspect necessary to the consideration of empathy was that of Compassion (an aspect of
Agreeableness with an explicit facet of empathy), the entire BFAS was administered in order to
identify any other mediating traits in the discussion of morality and the Dark Triad. The nine
remaining traits outside of Compassion are: Withdrawal and Volatility (Neuroticism), Politeness
(Agreeableness), Industriousness and Orderliness (Conscientiousness), Enthusiasm and
Assertiveness (Extraversion) and Intellect and Openness (Openness/ Intellect). Correlations
among the factor scores can be found in Table 4.
The BFAS questionnaire is very similar to those previously mentioned, and requires that
participants rate their level of agreement with a statement on a 5 point Likert scale (1 = strongly
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disagree; 5= strongly agree). The statements directly reflect the personal views of the
participants, in regards to their perception of self; for instance, “I have a very active
imagination.”
The BFAS has been around for quite some time, and has been used in numerous previous
studies. Its results map well onto other constructs and measures of personality, and it is decidedly
shorter than some existing and commonly applied assessments. Furthermore, its use of 10
aspects, which act as subscales for the more frequently acknowledged and taught Big Five
factors, provides greater opportunities for the application of personality to other phenomena,
such as the D3.
Table 4
Cronbach’s alphas and Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the 10 BFAS aspects.

1.5 Sociosexual Orientation Inventory (SOIR) (Penke & Asendorpf, 2008)
“Sociosexuality,” as a term, was defined by renowned biologist Alfred Kinsey in the
mid1900s, and refers to “individual differences in people’s willingness to engage in
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uncommitted sexual relationships” (p. 1113). Over time, it has become clear that some
individuals are more inclined to engage in these “expectationfree” relationships, but it is further
apparent that certain personality types correlate with a greater proclivity for uncommitted sex.
For instance, as previously discussed, psychopaths are more interested in shortterm
mating—they seek instant gratification, low commitment encounters. Therefore, assessing the
relationship between sociosexuality and the D3 provides insight into which traits, beyond
psychopathy, may predispose one to these lowstakes liaisons.
The SOIR is a very short measure of global sociosexuality—it has just 9 items.
However, these items can be further broken down to encompass three theoretically significant
additional components: past behavioral experiences, attitude toward uncommitted sex, and
sociosexual desire. In this study, those components are operationalized as behavior, attitude, and
desire. Correlations between these components and those of a measure of infidelity are provided
in Table 5.
Participants are asked to respond to three items with a numeric total, with options ranging
from “0” to “20 or more.” Questions such as, “with how many different partners have you had
sex within the past 12 months?” form the 3item priorbehavior facet. Respondents are also asked
to rate their level of agreement with six additional items in the form of statements, such as “sex
without love is OK.” These items are measured along a 9 point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 2 =
strongly agree), and items 46 form the attitude facet and 79 form the desire facet. All 9 items
can be totalled together to form a global Sociosexuality score. Ultimately, lower global scores
indicate a more restricted sociosexual orientation. Higher scores, of course, indicate an
unrestricted orientation, and are likely related to promiscuity and flirtatiousness.
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The scale itself has proven useful in understanding the different natural motivations
behind sociosexuality and mating behavior, and its results consistently provide support for the
idea and value of differentiating between components. With only a global measure of
sociosexuality or promiscuity, some obviously componentspecific effects may be lost.
1.6 Intentions Towards Infidelity Scale (ITIS) (Jones, Olderbak, & Figueredo, 2011)
Sociosexuality provides a solid foundation for understanding mating behavior, but
neglects to consider an important factor—infidelity. Not surprisingly, those who are more likely
to engage in uncommitted sexual relationships tend to have higher sociosexual scores, which
indicates greater promiscuity. Promiscuity, as previously noted, is often highly correlated with
infidelity, such that individuals who are more interested in shortterm mating are more likely to
ignore defined relationship boundaries and expectations in the pursuit of instant gratification.
Since all of this fits the psychopathic tendency to avoid commitment and violate it when
ensnared, the ITIS was administered to the sample.
Due to the neverending emotional (and potentially medical) fallout of infidelity, authors
Jones, Olderbak, and Figueredo sought to develop a measure that would allow them to predict an
individual’s likelihood in engaging in unfaithful behaviors, ranging from hiding relationship
status from an attractive potential mate to actual planned perfidy, if the opportunity arose. From
this intent came the ITIS, a 7item questionnaire, which allows participants to respond to
questions of likelihood on a scale (1 = not at all likely; 7 = extremely likely). Correlations
between these the ITIS and SOIR components can be found in Table 5.
Convergent and discriminant validity of the ITIS appears to be quite decent, and it has
notably significant correlations with measures of attachment style, selfreport measures of
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frequency of infidelity, sociosexual attitudes and behavior, longterm mating orientation, and
relationship satisfaction. Additionally, the ITIS has moderate to significant correlations with
some of the Big Five factors of personality (measured by the BFAS), and with impulsive
sensation seeking and aggression/hostility, similar to elements of the TriPM.
Conclusively, the ITIS predicts infidelity, relationship satisfaction, and relationship
dissolution, and undoubtedly serves as an important factor in the consideration of psychopathy,
sexual behavior, and morality.
Table 5
Cronbach’s alphas and Pearson’s correlation coefficients between SOIR and ITIS components.

1. Behavior

.81

2. Attitude

.84

3. Desire

.92

4. Sociosexuality

.88

5. Infidelity

.81

*** p < .001

1

2

3

4

5

—

0.510***

0.338***

0.722***

0.352***

—

0.562***

0.884***

0.331***

—

0.802***

0.355***

—

0.425***
—

Note. SOIR = Sociosexual Orientation Inventory, ITIS = Intentions Towards Infidelity
Scale.

Results and Discussion
Somewhat surprisingly, none of the Dark Triad indices or TriPM psychopathy dimensions
were significantly related to a global morality index, assessed by the Moralization of Everyday
Life Scale (MELS) total score. Zeroorder correlations between all six morality subscale scores
and the D3 and TriPM factors are provided in Table 6.
All three D3 traits were significantly and negatively related to Deception. Additionally,
Narcissism and Psychopathy were positively correlated with Laziness, and Psychopathy was also
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negatively correlated with Hurt. Machiavellianism produced no other significant relationships
with the remaining MELS factors. Among the Triarchic Model components, Boldness was only
weakly and positively correlated with Laziness, whereas Meanness and Disinhibition
demonstrated significant relationships with Deception, Harm, and Laziness. Meanness also
exhibited stronger effects, and was correlated negatively with the Failure subscale.
Table 6
Cronbach’s alphas and Zeroorder Correlations for the SD3, TriPM, and MELS factors.
Morality Factor

PSYCHO

NARCIS

MACH

BOLD

MEAN

DISINHIB

Deception

.80

0.334***

0.230**

0.344***

0.001

0.389***

0.267***

Harm

.76

0.182*

0.086

0.045

0.045

0.308***

0.213**

Laziness

.88

0.244***

0.256***

0.048

0.173*

0.210**

0.177*

Failure

.87

0.012

0.009

0.072

0.085

0.160*

0.005

Body

.86

0.011

0.044

0.082

0.014

0.021

0.045

Disgust

.81

0.042

0.078

0.052

0.070

0.052

0.014

MELS Total

.85

0.047

0.013

0.084

0.067

0.134

0.042

*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Multiple regression was performed in order to determine which aspects of the Dark Triad
and psychopathy were most important in their relationship to the MELS assessment of morality.
The D3 indices were entered in a primary block, followed by the TriPM components in a
secondary block, to predict Deception, Harm, and Laziness, in turn. Only these factors of the
MELS were subjected to multiple regression due to their significant and numerous relationships
within the intercorrelation matrix in Table 6.
In order to avoid multicollinearity, which can occur when a few of the predictors in a
regression model are significantly correlated such as these, the Dark Triad measure of
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psychopathy was used as the exclusive measure of psychopathy. Using this succinct measure also
allowed for the avoidance of item overlap between the TriPM scales in the second regression
block and the Dark Triad in the first.
From here, it became apparent that the Dark Triad (Adj. R2 = .14, p < .001) followed by
Triarchic Psychopathy (R2 Change = .05, p < .05) measures were both significant in predicting
the moral factor of Deception. Intriguingly, Machiavellianism was the driving predictor (β = .21,
p < . 05) from the Dark Triad, whereas Meanness (β = .23, p < . 05) was the major and sole
predictor from the TriPM. For the Harm factor, the TriPM played an even greater role (R2
Change = .07, p < .005) over the D3 measure (Adj. R2 = .03, p < .05): D3 Psychopathy (β = .28,
p < .05) and TriPM Meanness (β = .36, p < .005. ) were the sole predictors of Harm within each
block. For the factor of Laziness, the D3 was significant (R2 Change = .07, p < .005) and the
TriPM added no incremental prediction (Adj. R2 = .03, p < .05). Within the Dark Triad measure,
all predictors were significant and of similar effect size. Whereas Machiavellianism contributed
to lower scores, Narcissism and Psychopathy indices contributed to higher scores on the MELS
factor of Laziness, referring to one’s decisions to behave morally only when it is convenient.
Incidentally, when the composite or total MELS score was used as the criterion variable,
the overall equation was not significant (p > .35), in which case, only TriPM Meanness
approached significance (p < .10).
As expected, many of the D3 indices and TriPM components were significantly related to
the Big Five aspects scales (BFAS) of personality, including the intended predictor of empathy,
Compassion. Zeroorder correlations between all ten aspects and the D3 indices and TriPM
constructs are available in Table 7. These correlations with the BFAS are highly consistent with
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those reported in a recent study by Jonason, Kaufman, Webster, and Geher (2013) who used the
briefer measure of the D3, the Dirty Dozen.
Table 7
Bivariate Correlations for the SD3, TriPM, and BFAS.
Personality
Measure

PSYCHO

NARCIS

MACH

BOLD

MEAN

DISINHIB

Withdrawal

.90

.09 (.09)

.38c (.09)

.17a (.01)

.79c

.11

.46c

Volatility

.92

.23b (.22b)

.20b (.18b)

.19a (.14a)

.55c

.24b

.49c

Enthusiasm

.88

.01 (.24b)

.46c (.06)

.08 (.03)

.67c

.24b

.33c

Assertiveness

.92

.27c (.09)

.77c (.20b)

.17a (.14b)

.84c

.09

.18a

Intellect

.88

.02 (.07)

.41c (.05)

.02 (.07)

.59c

.15a

.36c

Openness

.83

.10 (.00)

.18a (.02)

.05 (.02)

.20c

.32c

.16a

Compassion

.90

.30c (.30b)

.08 (.07)

.32c (.14a)

.27c

.62c

.38c

Politeness

.83

.76c (.32c)

.51c (.33b)

.52c (.43c)

.16a

.76c

.58c

Industriousness

.89

.15a (.16a)

.34c (.14a)

.13 (.14a)

.58c

.27c

.59c

Orderliness

.83

.18a (.22b)

.11 (.09)

.05 (.18b)

.02

.21b

.37c

a = p < .05, b = p < .01, c = p < .001
Note. Zeroorder correlations with the Dirty Dozen reported in Jonason et al. (2013) are in parentheses.

Of the D3 traits, Narcissism was significantly related to all of the BFAS aspects except
for, interestingly enough, Compassion and Orderliness. Machiavellianism and Psychopathy were
more strongly correlated with fewer aspects, but both were significant and negatively related to
Compassion. Humorously, all three traits were significantly and negatively associated with
Politeness, and positively associated with Assertiveness, though Machiavellianism was the most
significant for the latter aspect. Other intriguing but less pertinent relationships were revealed as
well. Regarding the TriPM constructs, all three dimensions were significantly correlated with
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Compassion, though only Boldness was positively so. Meanness was significantly related to all
aspects except for Withdrawal and Assertiveness, but Disinhibition, curiously, was related to all
aspects (primarily negatively) without fail.
Regarding mating behavior and intentions, all of the Dark Triad indices and all but the
Boldness dimension of the TriPM were significantly and positively correlated with the total
Sociosexuality score and the Infidelity measure. Zeroorder correlations between the three facets
and total SOIR score, ITIS, score, and the D3 and TriPM factors are given in Table 8.
All of the D3 and TriPM dimensions were significantly correlated with the SOIR facets
and ITIS scales, except for Narcissism, which was unrelated to Desire, and Boldness, which did
not correlate with Desire or Infidelity. Within the D3, Narcissism was highly and positively
correlated with Attitude, suggesting that narcissists are generally in favor of uncommitted sexual
encounters, likely as a method of gaining fast and passionate praise. Machiavellianism was
significantly and positively related to Behavior, which is also unsurprising. This is likely the
result of comfort and confidence in interpersonal manipulation—many prior uncommitted
interactions. Among the Triarchic Model components, Boldness was significantly and positively
correlated with Attitude and overall Sociosexuality, and Disinhibition was strongly related to
attitude. This last relationship is especially meaningful, as it supports the idea that impulsiveness
feeds positivity towards “meaningless” sex.
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Table 8
Bivariate Correlations for the SD3, TriPM, SOIR, and ITIS.
Sociosexual
Factor

PSYCHO

NARCIS

MACH

BOLD

MEAN

DISINHIB

Behavior

.81

0.412***

0.310***

0.155*

0.362***

0.248***

0.255***

Attitude

.84

0.384***

0.241**

0.253***

0.226**

0.303***

0.168*

Desire

.92

0.353***

0.090

0.312***

0.003

0.353***

0.267***

Sociosexuality

.88

0.471***

0.256***

0.301***

0.232**

0.377***

0.273***

Infidelity

.81

0.588***

0.242***

0.326***

0.026

0.521***

0.409***

*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Multiple regression was performed in order to determine which aspects of the D3 and
TriPM psychopathy measures were most relevant to the SOIR and ITIS scores. The D3 scales of
Machiavellianism and Narcissism and the TriPM total score were entered in a single block to
predict total Sociosexuality score. Only these measures were used as independent variables, since
D3 Psychopathy did not produce any outstandingly significant relationships, and all three TriPM
constructs were correlated about the same with Sociosexuality. Multicollinearity was avoided as
before.
Ultimately, Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and TriPM total (Adj. R2 = .21, p < .001) were
all significant in predicting Sociosexuality. It appears that TriPM total (β = .43, p < . 001) was
the most significant predictor of Sociosexuality, which is unsurprisingly. The next most relevant
was Machiavellianism (β = .16, p < . 05), and then Narcissism (β = .07, p < . 05). Another
regression was performed within the three TriPM constructs as well, and in that case Boldness
was the most significant predictor (β = .25, p < . 001).
An additional regression was executed to assess Infidelity with the D3 (Adj. R2 = .36, p <
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.001). Here, Psychopathy was the best predictor (β = .66, p < . 001), and remained to be so when
regressed with TriPM total (β = .57, p < . 001). When D3 Psychopathy was removed, TriPM total
(β = .40, p < . 05) was the best predictor of Infidelity over Machiavellianism and Narcissism.
Finally, among the TriPM constructs exclusively, Meanness (β = .40, p < . 001) was the most
significant predictor of Infidelity.
Lastly, an intercorrelation matrix was generated between the ITIS, SOIR, and the MELS
factors, which resulted in a couple of particularly significant relationships: Laziness was
significantly and positively correlated with Infidelity (Pearson’s r = .146, p < .05), which
suggests that a great deal of unfaithful behavior may be the result of convenience and
availability. Also, Harm was significantly and negatively associated with the three SOIR facets
of Behavior, Attitude, and Desire (Pearson’s r = .181, .159, and .171, respectively, p < .05).
Since Harm is related to the detrimental behavior exhibited towards members of one’s
community, “whether intimate relationship partners or simply fellow citizens,” this effect may
indicate that higher sociosexuality (or interest in noncommittal sexual relationships) produces
lower likelihood to trample others (Lovett et al., p. 251). In a way, this makes the most sense in
intimate relationships—having a longterm mate provides a frequent target for attack and abuse.
Additionally, when choosing a shortterm mate, one tends to avoid partners who seem inclined
towards maltreatment.
Discussion and Conclusion
In addition to moral decisionmaking and life history approach, the current study also examined
personality traits comprising the D3 constructs. Using the Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS;
DeYoung et al., 2007), it appears that the aspect of Politeness appears to be the most robust trait
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related to the D3. Although these findings are similar to what Jonason et al. (2013) have reported
for the D3 and the BFAS, the Big Five aspect of Compassion has been hypothesized to be an
even more important BFAS correlate of psychopathy. The importance of Politeness over
Compassion suggests that the tendency to break rules or otherwise nonconform seems to be a
much more central characteristic than an emotional disregard for or attachment to others, within
the Dark Triad. Additional analyses comparing BFAS Politeness and Compassion in the role of
the D3 may prove helpful in further understanding this set of relationships. More generally,
findings from the BFAS emphasize extraversion and boldness in narcissistic tendencies.
Relationships with the BFAS also highlight a need to solve intellectual problems, which may
play out as conniving manipulation, and a strong need to achieve and engage in competition. For
Machiavellianism, Politeness was strongest (Pearson’s r = .52) followed by Compassion
(Pearson’s r = .32). This effect for Compassion was only shared with Psychopathy but, as noted
earlier, not with Narcissism. Perhaps narcissists, individuals likely hypersensitive to selfpain,
such as criticism, may have an ironically better perspective from which to empathize. If
psychopaths are less sensitive to passive punishment, at least, this may speak to some general
lack of emotional sensitivity assessed by the BFAS Compassion scale.
Including the BFAS also provided a check on the validity of this study. As previously
mentioned, Jonason et al. (2013) also examined the relationships between the D3 and BFAS, and
when the overall pattern of relationships between the two measures are compared across
samples, the findings are similar. The magnitude of the relationships observed in the present
study, however, are notably stronger. A likely explanation for these differences, and weaker
findings within the experiment by Jonason et al. is that they used a very brief measure of the D3
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constructs, called the Dirty Dozen. As mentioned earlier, this set of scales includes only 4 items
to measure each construct with reportedly low reliabilities and unexpected factor structures
(Jones & Paulhus, 2014). To illustrate the difference, the most robust BFAS effect across the D3
is the negative relationship to Politeness. For Jonason et al., the average effect (Pearson’s r) is
.36, but for the current study it is .60. According to the results of Fisher’s rtoz transformation,
the difference in the size of these correlations is significant (p < .01). In fact, when the same
pairwise comparisons were made for the full D3 by BFAS correlation matrix, 11 of 30
correlations differed significantly between studies, and all in the direction of higher magnitude
for the current study sample.
Ultimately, this study provided further insight and validity into the investigation of
relationships between the Dark Triad, morality, and evolutionary behaviors such as
sociosexuality and infidelity. The analyses that the author performed were by no means an
exhaustive use of the collected data. For instance, other significant and interesting correlations
remain to be seen, since data was gathered regarding participant religion, political leaning,
socioeconomic status, family dynamics, sexual experiences, and so on. In the future, and in the
author’s personal time, these potential relationships will be explored. However, the results
presented here emphasize the value of further research regarding all of the assessed factors.
Understanding individuals who express high levels of the Dark Triad traits is undeniably
beneficial to many fields of study, from philosophy to criminal profiling. More so, one can never
understand morality too well, especially with aversive personalities thrown into the societal mix.
Of course, evolution fits these trends as well. Though many people simply acknowledge the
existence of evolution as a counterpoint to Creationism, it provides an overwhelming amount of
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insight into the inner workings and sexual, social, and emotional faculties of the mind. Further
study of all three of these disciplines—personality, morality, and evolution—will always prove
beneficial to those who aim to oppose ignorance and comprehend humanity beyond the normal
scope.
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